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U.C.L.A. Law Review    
The School Civil Rights Vacuum   
Emily Suski
ABSTRACT
Recent cases of pervasive sex abuse at universities, including those committed by Larry Nassar at 
Michigan State University and by Jerry Sandusky at Pennsylvania State University, demonstrate the 
limitations of Title IX as a tool for protecting college students.  What has gone far less recognized is 
that in the K–12 public school context, Title IX and other civil rights laws, including the Fourteenth 
Amendment, are at least as ineffective at protecting students from sexual, physical, and verbal 
abuse and harassment.  Public school students rarely succeed on Fourteenth Amendment or Title 
IX claims, even in some of the most egregious cases.  Although these two potentially powerful civil 
rights laws should protect children from and remedy these harms, there is a civil rights vacuum in 
public schools.
This Article argues that courts unjustifiably limit public school liability under both the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title IX for student physical, verbal, and sexual harassment and abuse.  This 
jurisprudence is limited due to the courts’ misconceptions about families and schools.  Taken in 
the aggregate, these laws leave children, particularly low-income children, without protection and 
vulnerable in school.
In making these arguments, this Article is the first to demonstrate how the courts’ evaluations 
of these civil rights claims are based on misconceptions and are, therefore, unjustified.  It also 
exposes the collective failure of these civil rights laws to protect students.  As a remedy, this 
Article proposes changes to the assessment of these Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX 
claims that abandon misconceptions, increase schools’ potential for liability, and promote the 
development in schools of processes for preventing, discovering, and remedying students’ harms.
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INTRODUCTION 
When sisters Emily and Brittany Morrow attended Blackhawk High School 
in Beaver County, Pennsylvania, they were “verbally, physically, 
and . . . emotionally tormented” by another student, Shaquana Anderson.1  Among 
other things, Shaquana threatened Emily and Brittany, threw Brittany down a flight 
of stairs in school, and attacked Brittany in the school cafeteria.2  Shaquana’s friend, 
Abbey Harris, also elbowed Emily in the throat.3  Brittany, Emily, and their parents 
sought help from the school to stop the abuse.4  They “requested that the [school] 
do something to protect Brittany and Emily from the persistent harassment and 
bullying.”5  In response, school officials suggested that “the Morrows consider 
moving to a different school rather than removing the bully from the 
school.”6  Lacking any other immediate solution, Emily and Brittany enrolled in 
private school.7  They also brought a Fourteenth Amendment claim against 
the public school, arguing that it had a duty to protect them and failed to do so.8  
The Third Circuit denied their claim, however, finding no such duty exists for 
schools under the Fourteenth Amendment.9 
Emily and Brittany are not alone in their experience.10  Millions of students 
suffer physical, verbal, and sexual harassment and abuse in school.11  One of the 
 
1. Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 164–66 (3d Cir. 2013). 
2. Id. at 164–67. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. at 166. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 165; see also Kristen Doerschner, Family Seeks Change in Law to Protect Students From Being 
Bullied, Ellwood City Ledger (Sept. 30, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.ellwoodcityledger.com/article/ 
20130930/News/309309861 [https://perma.cc/YZT2-XP89] (“In October 2008, the Morrows 
made the decision to withdraw their daughters from [public school] and pay tuition to a private 
school for the remainder of their high school years.”). 
8. Morrow, 719 F.3d at 165.  The Morrows also argued that the public school violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment under a state-created danger theory.  Id.  The Third Circuit denied this 
claim.  Id. at 179. 
9. Id. at 177. 
10. Another example is that of T.M., a Georgia high school student who was sexually assaulted 
by another student.  Nora Caplan-Bricker, “My School Punished Me,” SLATE (Sept. 19, 2016, 
8:44 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2016/09/title_ix_sexual_assault_ 
allegations_in_k_12_schools.html [https://perma.cc/5Y95-5334].  When she reported the 
assault to her school, instead of protecting her, the school suspended her.  Id.  Similarly, a 
Michigan high school student was expelled after reporting her sexual assault in the school 
parking lot.  Emma Brown, Sexual Violence Isn’t Just a College Problem. It Happens in K–12 
Schools, Too., WASH. POST (Jan. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/ 
sexual-violence-isnt-just-a-college-problem-it-happens-in-k-12-schools-too/2016/01/17/a4a 
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most common ways children suffer physical and verbal abuse in school is through 
bullying.12  According to the National Center for Education Statistics, in the 2014–
15 school year, approximately one out of every five children in grades six through 
twelve experienced bullying—an estimated five million children.13  As disturbingly 
prevalent as it is, bullying is not the only way children experience physical and 
verbal abuse in school, and students are not the only perpetrators of it.  Teachers 
and other school staff also physically and verbally abuse children in school.14  In 
addition, students and school staff sexually harass and abuse students in school.  
From 2011 to 2015, approximately 17,000 students reported being sexually 
assaulted in school.15 
Although certain laws should serve as a bulwark against these harms, 




11. For example, in a 2015 report, over five million students, ages 12 to 18, reported experiencing 
some form of bullying.  DEBORAH LESSNE & CHRISTINA YANEZ, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, 
STUDENT REPORTS OF BULLYING: RESULTS FROM THE 2015 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE 
NATIONAL CRIME VICTIMIZATION SURVEY T-1, tbl.1.1 (2016) [hereinafter REPORTS OF BULLYING 
2015].  Of those students, over 1.2 million experienced some form of physical bullying, and over 
940,000 experienced threats.  Id.  A 2011 report found that 48 percent of students in grades 7 
through 12 experienced some form of sexual harassment.  Catherine Hill & Holly Kearl, Am. 
Ass’n OF Univ. Women, Crossing the Line: Sexual Harassment at School 11 (2011), 
https://www.aauw.org/files/2013/02/Crossing-the-Line-Sexual-Harassment-at-School.pdf  
[https://perma.cc/9U5P-CN93]. 
12. Bullying has severe, sometimes tragic, consequences for children.  See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, Girl’s 
Suicide Points to Rise in Apps Used by Cyberbullies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/14/us/suicide-of-girl-after-bullying-raises-worries-on-web-
sites.html (reporting the suicide of twelve-year-old Rebecca Ann Sedwick after being bullied by 
others in her school); Trevon Milliard, Father: White Middle School Student’s Suicide Related to 
Bullying, Las Vegas Rev. J. (Feb. 28, 2014, 7:26 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/news/father-
white-middle-school-students-suicide-related-to-bullying [https://perma.cc/NHB3-2PL9] 
(discussing the suicide of thirteen-year-old Hailee Lamberth, in which her suicide note blamed 
her suicide on school bullying). 
13. REPORTS OF BULLYING 2015, supra note 11, at T-1.  Other metanalyses have found the numbers 
of students who report involvement in bullying to be even higher.  One such study found that 35 
percent of students in grades 6 through 12 report some form of traditional bullying and 15 
percent reported cyber bullying.  Kathryn L. Modecki et al., Bullying Prevalence Across Contexts: 
A Meta-Analysis Measuring Cyber and Traditional Bullying, 55 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 602, 
607 (2014). 
14. See infra Subpart I.C.  The harm by teachers and other school staff can cause serious, long-term 
consequences.  See, e.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 601 (11th Cir. 2010) (T.W., 
a student who was abused by his teacher, developed post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and 
dropped out of school). 
15. Robin McDowell et al., Hidden Horror of School Sex Assaults Revealed by AP, AP NEWS (May 
1, 2017), https://apnews.com/1b74feef88df4475b377dcdd6406ebb7 [https://perma.cc/ 2JTV-
4DTR].  That number, however, is likely under-representative.  Sexual assaults are 
underreported, and some states do not even track the incidences of sexual assault.  Id. 
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IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 have powerful potential to protect 
children and remedy harm.16  Because claims under these laws can be brought 
against the school system, and not just the individuals who caused the harm, they 
offer the promise of both individual remedies and systemwide reforms.17  Children 
who are verbally and physically abused by teachers and other students in school 
generally assert two kinds of claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: (1) a 
claim alleging that the schools had a duty to protect them and failed, and (2) a claim 
alleging the schools violated their right to personal liberty and bodily integrity.18  
Children who are sexually harassed and abused in school bring claims under Title 
IX for sex discrimination.19  These plaintiffs rarely succeed, however.20  In fact, no 
federal court of appeals has ever recognized a Fourteenth Amendment duty to 
protect claim by students against the public schools.21  Despite being designed 
 
16. See infra Subpart III.A. 
17. Tort law might seem an obvious first recourse for claims involving harms to children in school.  
However, it falls short of the task of protecting students from the harm in the first place.  State 
law immunity and comparable defenses often insulate schools from liability.  See infra note 31 
and accompanying text.  Moreover, unlike federal civil rights laws, tort law is not designed to 
hold public institutions accountable for harms.  It generally only holds individual tortfeasors 
responsible for harm.  Thus, it holds less promise as a systemic-reform tool.  Id.  For thoughtful 
analyses on the limits of tort law to remedy harms to children in schools, see Samantha Neiman 
et al., Bullying: A State of Affairs, 41 J.L. & EDUC. 603, 627 (2012) (“Even when conduct by a 
school official satisfies the elements of a common law cause of action, various forms of 
immunity from tort liability often serve as shields to school districts and/or individual school 
officials.”); Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Anti-Gay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 385, 
410 (2012) (concluding “the prognosis is also dim” for redress in tort for bullying because of the 
challenges of proving causation and overcoming immunity); Daniel B. Weddle, Bullying in 
Schools: The Disconnect Between Empirical Research and Constitutional, Statutory, and Tort 
Duties to Supervise, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 641 (2004) (offering a comprehensive analysis of 
limitations of tort law as a remedy for bullying in school).  See also Mark C. Weber, Disability 
Harassment in the Public Schools, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1079, 1145–47 (2002) (explaining 
how state law immunity bars claims of disability harassment in schools). 
18. See infra Subparts I.A–I.B. 
19. See infra Subpart I.C. 
20. See infra Subparts I.A–I.C. 
21. At least eight circuits have considered such claims, and they have all declined to find the schools 
have a duty to protect students.  Patel v. Kent Sch. Dist., 648 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Hasenfus v. LaJeunesse, 175 F.3d 68, 71 (1st Cir. 1999); Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 
F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th 
Cir. 1995); Graham v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. I-89, 22 F.3d 991, 993–95 (10th Cir. 1994); Dorothy 
J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993); D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area 
Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. 
Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990).  These claims have not been denied 
without dissent or question, though.  For example, in Morrow v. Balaski, Judge Nygaard, who 
also dissented in Middle Bucks, wrote that “more than twenty years ago” he believed that the girls 
in Middle Bucks had “stated viable constitutional claims against the school district.”  Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 202–03 (3d Cir. 2013).  “My position has not changed, and today, I would 
hold the same in this case.”  Id. at 202–03 (Nygaard, J., dissenting); see also Middle Bucks, 972 
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to hold the state accountable for violations of civil rights, nevertheless, the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX can shield public schools from liability.22 
This Article argues that the courts unjustifiably limit public school liability 
under these Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims for students’ verbal, 
physical, and sexual harassment and abuse.23  This jurisprudence is limited due in 
large part to courts’ misconceptions about both families and schools.24  More 
specifically, these misconceptions are that families, not schools, have total 
responsibility for protecting their children even during the school day; schools have 
expertise in matters of pedagogy and discipline warranting extraordinary judicial 
deference to their decisions; and schools labor under substantial burdens, and 
therefore courts should only very carefully and rarely add to those burdens by 
imposing liability.25 
Further, these laws’ anemic reach has three serious, troubling consequences.  
First, it affords schools substantial discretion to do little, and sometimes nothing, in 
response to student harms.  Second, it shifts the burden of addressing student 
harms to families, which is a nearly impossible task because families are not at 
school with their children.26  Third, these effects disproportionately burden low-
income families, who now comprise a majority of the public school population.  
They lack the social and financial resources needed for the task of protecting 
children from and addressing the harms that occur in school.27 
Recognition of the misconceptions that support public school liability limits 
under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, however, would allow courts to 
 
F.2d at 1377 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (stating “I would hold that the state compulsion that 
students attend school, the status of most students as minors . . . [and] the discretion extended 
by the state to schools to control student behavior . . . combine to create the type of special 
relationship which imposes a constitutional duty on the schools to protect the liberty interests of 
students while they” are in school); T.K. v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 308 
(E.D.N.Y. 2011) (“It is uncertain whether under the Due Process Clause, a public school has the 
duty to protect an elementary school student from bullying where truancy laws are in effect. 
This question need not be answered now since students have a right to be secure in school and 
schools have a duty to prevent students from harassment under IDEA and Title IX.”). 
22. The Fourteenth Amendment, enforced by way of Section 1983 actions, of course works to 
constrain the state from violating individual rights.  Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972) 
(“The very purpose of § 1983 [is] to interpose the federal courts between the States and the 
people, as guardians of the people’s federal rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional 
action under color of state law.”).  Title IX’s core purpose is to constrain public schools from 
denying students the benefits of education because of sexual discrimination.  20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) 
(2018). 
23. See infra Subpart I.D. 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See infra Part II. 
26. See infra Subpart III.B. 
27. See infra Subpart III.C. 
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abandon them.  Abandoning those misconceptions in turn justifies changing the 
assessment of Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims such that they can more 
effectively protect children from and address their harms in school.  This Article 
proposes these changes.  It also makes three contributions to the scholarly discourse 
on civil rights in schools.  First, it is the first to demonstrate how the courts’ 
evaluations of these Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX claims are based on 
misconceptions and are therefore unjustified.28  Second, it exposes how the 
collective failures of these civil rights laws to realize their potential for addressing 
children’s harms in school leave children vulnerable.  Third, it proposes changes to 
the assessment of these claims that can better shape schools’ responses to those 
harms and protect children.29 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I analyzes three civil rights claims 
that students bring for harms suffered in school: (1) Fourteenth Amendment 
claims alleging schools had a duty to protect students and failed, (2) Fourteenth 
Amendment claims that schools violated students’ personal liberty and bodily 
integrity, and (3) Title IX claims for peer sexual harassment.  It shows how courts 
severely limit public schools’ liability under all of these claims and how collectively 
this jurisprudence leaves students with limited legal protections in school.  Part II 
then argues that these liability limits are largely without justification.  They are 
instead based on misconceptions about both schools and families.  Part III 
discusses the consequences of this limited jurisprudence, including that it both 
 
28. Other scholars have explored the limits of these laws individually.  For example, Catharine A. 
MacKinnon recently critiqued Title IX for its failure to hold schools accountable for sexual 
harassment.  Catharine A. MacKinnon, In Their Hands: Restoring Institutional Liability for 
Sexual Harassment in Education, 125 YALE L.J. 2038 (2016).  Others have analyzed the limits of 
Fourteenth Amendment claims for personal liberty and bodily integrity claims in the school 
context.  Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Officials’ Use of Physical Force As a Fourth 
Amendment Seizure: Protecting Students From the Constitutional Chasm Between the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2000) (advancing a Fourth 
Amendment theory for evaluating the constitutionality of school officials’ intentional use of 
force against students).  Some have examined the implications of the courts’ failure to find a 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect on individuals generally.  Sarah L. Swan, Bystander 
Interventions, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 975, 1003–06 (pointing that the lack of a Fourteenth 
Amendment duty to protect impedes a theory of bystander intervention initiatives).  None have 
considered the collective impact of these laws. 
29. This project is part of a broader endeavor to examine the bounds of public schools’ 
responsibilities for students.  In a previous article, I critique the expansion of schools’ authority 
over students’ online activity through cyberbullying laws.  Emily F. Suski, Beyond the 
Schoolhouse Gates: The Unprecedented Expansion of School Surveillance Authority Under 
Cyberbullying Laws, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 63 (2014).  I have also compared schools’ 
responsibility for harms to children with that of their families.  Emily F. Suski, The Privacy of the 
Public Schools, 77 MD. L. REV. 427 (2018) [hereinafter Suski, The Privacy of the Public Schools].  
This Article takes that analysis further by exploring the reasons for and the implications of 
schools’ limited liability under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX. 
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affords schools nearly unbridled discretion to do little or nothing when students are 
harmed and that it burdens families.  Part IV proposes changes to courts’ 
assessment of these claims that would abandon the misconceptions and promote 
the development by schools of both procedural and substantive responses to 
students’ harms that better protect them.  More specifically, it contends that 
correcting the misconceptions in Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX 
jurisprudence justifies both a new classification of custody and a burden-shifting 
framework in Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect cases; a new plausibility 
standard in Fourteenth Amendment bodily integrity claims; and a reinterpretation 
of notice and deliberate indifference in the Title IX context.  Such changes would 
better equip courts to find public school liability, protect students who are harmed, 
and prompt broader reform measures in schools to protect all children.  In other 
words, it proposes changes to the evaluation of these claims that would realize the 
potential of these civil rights laws to protect children who are harmed in school. 
I. SCHOOLS’ LIMITED LIABILITY UNDER THE FOURTEENTH  
AMENDMENT AND TITLE IX 
Children suffer many kinds of harms in school, including physical, verbal, 
and sexual abuse and harassment.30  To the extent schools have any institutional 
liability under tort for such harms, they often can avoid it because of state law 
immunity.31  Students, therefore, understandably look to federal law, including the 
 
30. See supra notes 10–15 and accompanying text. 
31. JAMES A. RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 12.07 (2016).  States’ laws often grant schools immunity from 
liability for acts of their employees if the acts constitute discretionary functions.  Id.  Although 
states differ on which acts fall into the category of such functions, this grant of immunity has 
served as a significant bar to public school liability.  Id.  Even when schools do not have statutory 
immunity, they still evade liability by asserting numerous generous defenses.  Id. § 12.14(5).  For 
example, negligent supervision claims for failing to properly supervise employees or other 
students require “standards of knowledge [that] are significant and . . . a foreseeable risk of 
harm.”  Id. § 12.14(5)(b)(iii).  Schools, therefore, successfully defend based on lack of knowledge 
or foreseeability.  E.g., Conklin v. Saugerties Cent. Sch. Dist., 966 N.Y.S.2d 575 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2013) (holding a school district not liable when a student was assaulted by another student and 
the school knew the assaulting student had threatened to have the fight).  This defense has 
worked to protect schools from liability when students have shot, stabbed, and in one case 
fought other students, despite warnings that the fight might occur.  RAPP, supra, § 12.12(2)(b).  
Similarly, under vicarious liability claims like respondeat superior claims, schools avoid liability 
if they can prove that an employee’s actions that harmed a student were outside the scope of 
employment.  Id. § 12.14(4)(b).  This defense operates as a substantial bar to school liability 
because courts often find that intentional torts fall outside the scope of employment.  E.g., John 
Doe 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 955 N.Y.S.2d 600, 602 (N.Y. 2012) (finding no public school liability in tort 
where a teacher’s aide had a sexual relationship with a student because, among other things, it 
was outside the scope of employment).  But see Booth v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 49 So. 3d 919 
(La. Ct. App. 2010) (finding a school board could be held liable where a janitor assaulted a 
728 66 UCLA L. REV. 720 (2019) 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, to seek protection and redress.32  They bring 
two kinds of claims under the Fourteenth Amendment: One alleging that the 
schools have a duty to protect them and failed, and another alleging that the schools 
violated their right to personal liberty and bodily integrity.33  They also bring claims 
against schools for sexual harassment under Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972.34  Students, however, find limited success in their efforts to 
hold the public schools liable for even significant harms.35  Although these laws 
exist to protect students’ civil rights, the courts’ assessment of these claims shields 
schools from liability. 
A. Fourteenth Amendment Duty to Protect Claims 
Students who are physically, verbally, and sexually harmed in school bring 
claims against the public schools under the Fourteenth Amendment for failing to 
protect them.  These claims are based on the theory that the schools have a special 
relationship with students, giving rise to a duty to protect them.36  The courts, 
however, do not just limit these claims.  They preclude them entirely, finding that 
the schools have no such relationship with and no such duty to students.37  Their 
conclusions stem from an assessment of schools’ custodial and caretaking 
relationship with students. 
The seminal such case is D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical 
School.38  Middle Bucks involved two high school girls with disabilities who were 
repeatedly physically and sexually assaulted over a period of approximately five 
 
student).  Children seeking redress under tort theories of liability, then, are often caught in the 
proverbial catch-22.  Either the schools have immunity because their employee’s actions are 
discretionary, or they avoid liability because the torts are beyond the scope of employment. 
32. Title IX has its own private right of action, whereas a Fourteenth Amendment claim can be 
brought under Section 1983 claims to enforce constitutional rights and remedy violations.  
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1986) (“We have repeatedly noted 
that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates ‘a species of tort liability’ in favor of persons who are deprived of 
‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured’ to them by the Constitution.’” (quoting Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978))).  In Cannon v. University of Chicago, the U.S. Supreme Court 
found an implied private right of action under Title IX.  441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979) (“The package 
of statutes of which Title IX is one part also contains a provision whose language and history 
demonstrate that Congress itself understood Title VI, and thus its companion, Title IX, as 
creating a private remedy.”). 
33. See infra Subparts I.A–I.B. 
34. See infra Subpart I.C. 
35. See infra Subparts I.A–I.C. 
36. See infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. 
37. The Supreme Court has not heard a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claim in the public 
school context, but all the federal courts of appeals that have heard the claims have found that no 
such duty exists.  See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
38. 972 F.2d 1364 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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months by other students in a bathroom inside a school classroom.39  As a result of 
the assaults, which the public school knew about but did nothing, the girls brought 
a Fourteenth Amendment claim against the public school.40  They alleged that the 
school had a special relationship with them, giving rise to a duty to protect them.41 
Their theory relied on the special relationship doctrine developed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble42 and Youngberg v. Romeo,43 respectively an 
Eighth Amendment case involving prison inmates44 and a Fourteenth 
Amendment case involving persons involuntarily committed to mental 
institutions.45  In those cases, the Court concluded that the state has an affirmative 
duty under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to protect inmates and 
involuntarily institutionalized people because the state creates a special relationship 
with them by taking custody of them.46  In Youngberg, the Court said this special 
relationship gives rise to an “unquestioned duty to provide reasonable safety for all 
residents and personnel within the institution.”47 
In Middle Bucks, the girls argued that the public school had a similarly special 
custodial relationship with them because they were required by law to attend 
school, and the school had substantial control over them while the students 
were at school.48  The Third Circuit, however, rejected that claim.49  The court 
based its opinion less on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Estelle and Youngberg 
than on its decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social 
Services.50  In DeShaney, the Supreme Court heard the tragic case of a boy whose 
father had abused him to the point of permanent brain damage.51  The state 
 
39. Id. at 1366. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1368. 
42. 429 U.S. 97 (1976). 
43. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
44. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97. 
45. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 307. 
46. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97; Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 307.  In Youngberg, an adult with severe intellectual 
disabilities was, among other things, suffering injuries while in the care of a state mental health 
facility.  Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 309–10.  His injuries included a fractured arm.  Id. at 310.  As a 
result of these injuries and other treatment, he brought a Fourteenth Amendment claim alleging 
the state had an affirmative duty to protect him.  Id. at 310.  The Court concluded that, “[i]f it is 
cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe conditions, it must be 
unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed—who may not be punished at all—in 
unsafe conditions.”  Id. at 315–16. 
47. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 324. 
48. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371. 
49. Id. at 1373. 
50. Id. at 1369; 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
51. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 193. 
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Department of Social Services (DSS) had been involved in the case.52  Among other 
things, a DSS case worker had been called into the hospital after the boy, Joshua, 
sustained suspicious injuries.53  The DSS then began making monthly visits to his 
home, but it did not have custody of the boy at the time of the injury.54  Joshua and 
his mother claimed the state’s involvement created a duty to protect him.55  The 
Court concluded otherwise, explaining “[i]t is the State’s affirmative act of 
restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf—through 
incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint of personal liberty—
which is the ‘deprivation of liberty’ triggering the protections of the Due Process 
Clause.”56 
Drawing on that reasoning, the Third Circuit in Middle Bucks said “the school 
defendants’ authority over [the plaintiff]  during the school day cannot be said to 
create the type of physical custody necessary to bring it within the special 
relationship noted in DeShaney.”57  It found that mandatory attendance 
requirements do not restrict students’ freedom to the extent that it denies them 
“meaningful access to help.”58  It said that the “parents remain the primary 
caretakers, despite [students’] presence in school.”59  Because it found parents 
responsible for and able to take care of their children while the children were at 
school, the court concluded that schools have no custodial relationship with 
students and therefore no duty to protect them.60 
Other courts to consider the issue have relied on the same rationale to find 
that public schools have no duty to protect students under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In cases where schools know about the harm to students but abdicate 
any role in addressing it or protecting them from it, courts still find schools have no 
duty to protect students from those harm imposed by private individuals.61  In 
 




56. Id. at 200. 
57. D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch.972 F.2d 1364, 1372 (3d Cir. 
1992) (en banc). 
58. Id.  For example, the court said that the students’ parents “retain the discretion to remove [their 
children] from classes.”  Id. at 1371. 
59. Id. 
60. Id. at 1371–72. 
61. For example, in Morrow v. Balaski, the Third Circuit considered another Fourteenth 
Amendment duty to protect claim in the context of student bullying.  719 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 
2013).  The court acknowledged in Morrow that the plaintiffs, sisters Emily and Brittany 
Morrow, were “verbally, physically and—no doubt—emotionally tormented by a fellow 
student,” and the school did little to prevent the harm or protect them.  Id. at 166.  Instead, the 
principal told the girls’ parents that he “could not guarantee Brittany and Emily’s safety” and 
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addition, even when school staff commit the abuse, courts still find that schools 
have no Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect students.62 
B. Fourteenth Amendment Claims for Violations of Personal Security  
and Bodily Integrity 
When teachers and other school staff members harm students, students also 
bring Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claims against the public 
schools alleging a violation of their right to personal liberty and bodily integrity.63  
Though not easy claims to make, they are at least met with more success than 
students’ Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claims.64  The Supreme Court 
has not heard such a case, but lower courts have recognized the claim.65 
 
“advised the Morrows to consider another school for their children.”  Id. at 164–65.  Despite the 
school’s abdication of any responsibility for the girls’ safety in school, which the girls had to 
attend under mandatory attendance laws, and their parents’ inability to protect them while they 
were there, the court still found the school had no duty to protect them.  Id. at 177.  It reiterated 
its conclusion in Middle Bucks that compulsory attendance laws do not “so restrain students’ 
liberty that they can be considered to be in state custody” because “‘parents remain the primary 
caretakers.’”  Id. at 168. 
62. E.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding no duty 
where a school custodian raped a thirteen-year-old student in an empty classroom at school and 
her Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claim failed because “the student returns home 
each day” and “[p]arents remain the primary source for the basic needs of their children”); Sargi 
v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding no duty where a bus driver 
did not procure medical attention for a child who had collapsed from heart failure, leading to 
her death because “school attendance does not restrict a student’s liberty such that neither the 
child nor his parents are unable to attend to the child’s basic needs.  Despite mandatory school 
attendance laws, the parents, not the state, remain the child’s primary caretakers.”); Dorothy J. v. 
Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim that a school had a duty to 
protect a boy with intellectual disabilities when the boy was sexually assaulted by another boy at 
school, reasoning that “[p]ublic school attendance does not render a child’s guardians unable to 
care of the child’s basic needs.  In this regard, public schools are simply not analogous to prisons 
and mental institutions.”). 
63. See Hatfield v. O’Neill, 534 F. App’x 838 (11th Cir. 2013); T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 
F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010); Flores v. Sch. Bd., 116 F. App’x 504 (5th Cir. 2004). 
64. E.g., Hatfield, 534 F. App’x at 841–42 (finding a Fourteenth Amendment violation where a 
teacher struck a student multiple times, including in the location of her head where part of her 
brain had been removed). 
65. The lower courts recognizing these claims have generally followed the Fourth Circuit case, Hall 
v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607, 611 (4th Cir. 1980), which concluded “that there may be circumstances 
under which specific corporal punishment administered by state school officials gives rise to an 
independent federal cause of action to vindicate substantive due process rights.”  For example, 
the Second, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits, among others, have all followed the Fourth 
Circuit’s lead.  Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239 F.3d 246, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2001) 
(concluding that students have a “constitutional ‘right to be free from the use of excessive force’” 
(quoting Rodriguez v. Phillips, 66 F.3d 470, 476 (2d Cir. 1995))); Webb v. McCullough, 828 F.2d 
1151, 1158 (6th Cir. 1987) (“ It is well established that persons have a fourteenth amendment 
liberty interest in freedom from bodily injury.”); P.B. v. Koch, 96 F.3d 1298, 1302–03 (9th Cir. 
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To determine whether a school has violated a student’s right to personal 
liberty and bodily integrity, the courts apply the “shocks the conscience” 
standard.66  The courts generally agree that an evaluation under this standard 
requires weighing: (1) the need for the force used against the student; (2) the 
excessiveness of the force, meaning the proportionality between the need for and 
the amount of force used; (3) whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to 
maintain discipline or instead applied for the purpose of causing harm; and (4) the 
degree of the injury.67  Even for children who have been significantly harmed by 
teachers and other school staff, this test serves as a significant barrier to success.  
Courts assess the need and proportionality prongs in ways that limit schools’ 
liability.68 
First, when courts analyze the need for force used by schools, they accept 
almost any asserted pedagogical or disciplinary reason for the force.69  For example, 
in Domingo v. Kowalski, the court found no Fourteenth Amendment violation 
 
1996) (“[E]xcessive force by a principal against a student violated the student’s constitutional 
rights. The Fourteenth Amendment protects against the government’s interference with ‘an 
individual’s bodily integrity.’”); Neal ex rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1075 
(stating that “where an exercise of corporal punishment is ‘so brutal, demeaning, and harmful as 
to literally shock the conscience of the court’ . . . a student’s substantive due process rights are 
implicated” (quoting Hall, 621 F.2d at 613)). The Fifth Circuit, though recognizing the claim, is 
the outlier.  Unlike the other Circuit Courts, it only recognizes the constitutional claim based on 
excessive discipline or corporal punishment if there is also no state law remedy available for it.  
Moore v. Willis Indep. Sch. Dist., 233 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 2000).  It has said “as long as the state 
provides an adequate remedy, a public school student cannot state a claim for denial of 
substantive due process through excessive corporal punishment, whether it be against the school 
system, administrators, or the employee who is alleged to have inflicted the 
damage . . . ‘Educators in states that proscribe student mistreatment and provide a remedy’ do 
not, by definition, act ‘arbitrarily,’ a necessary predicate for substantive due process relief.”  
Moore, 233 F.3d at 874–75 (quoting Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1990)). 
66. Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 411 (6th Cir. 2016). 
67. E.g., id.  Not all courts use all four factors in analyzing these claims.  Some circuit courts do not 
analyze whether the force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain discipline as a separate 
factor or at all.  E.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 599–600 (11th Cir. 2010). 
68. These factors do not completely bar success, however.  Students do prevail in Fourteenth 
Amendment cases, but the cases in which they prevail often involve substantial physical harm.  
For example, the Eleventh Circuit found a school could be liable under the Fourteenth 
Amendment because a coach hit a student with a metal lock, causing him to lose his eye.  Neal ex 
rel. Neal v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2000).  Courts have been far more 
willing to find schools liable under the Fourteenth Amendment and not excuse the 
extreme force on pedagogical or disciplinary grounds when physical harm, as opposed to 
only emotional harm, results.  For an analysis of students’ substantive due process claims 
based on emotional harm, see Emily Suski, Dark Sarcasm in the Classroom: The Failure of the 
Courts to Recognize Students’ Severe Emotional Harm As Unconstitutional, 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
125 (2014). 
69. See Flores v. Sch. Bd. of DeSoto Par., 116 F. App’x 504 (5th Cir. 2004); T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. 
Bd. of Seminole Cty., Fla., 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010). 
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when teacher Marsha Kowalski strapped students with disabilities to toilets, chairs, 
and gurneys for extended periods of time.70  When she tied one student to a gurney 
in the hall outside her classroom, she also put a “chewy” cloth in his mouth and left 
him there alone.71  Despite this abuse, the court found no Fourteenth Amendment 
violation in part because it accepted Kowalski’s asserted, though implausible, 
pedagogical and disciplinary purposes for her treatment of the students.72  The 
court therefore found the first prong of the Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
satisfied.73 
In finding proper purposes, however, the court did not analyze the credibility 
of Kowalski’s asserted pedagogical and disciplinary goals—toilet training and 
teaching students to stay on task—in light of the evidence.74  It instead simply 
queried whether toilet training and such discipline themselves are proper purposes 
in isolation from the rest of the evidence in the case.75  Had the court considered 
whether these could have plausibly been Kowalski’s goals in light of that evidence, it 
would likely have had more difficulty finding that Kowalski had a proper 
educational purpose.  Because toilet training involves the relatively quick, time-
limited activity of using and then exiting a bathroom, Kowalski’s actions belied her 
stated purpose.76  In addition, leaving a child alone tied to a gurney with something 
in his mouth goes so beyond the bounds of proper discipline as to undermine the 
credibility of that stated goal.77  Yet the court did not delve into this kind of 
inquiry.78  Consequently, it was able to find a need for Kowalski’s force. 
 
70. Domingo, 810 F.3d at 416. 
71. Id. at 407. 
72. Id. at 412–13. 
73. Id. at 412. 
74. Id. at 412–13. 
75. Id. at 410–12 (“Kowalski’s educational and disciplinary techniques, though certainly 
questionable, were utilized for a proper educational purpose.”). 
76. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends leaving children with developmental 
disabilities on the toilet for only five to ten minutes at a time.  Toilet Training Children With 
Special Needs, HEALTHYCHILDREN.ORG, https://www.healthychildren.org/English/ages- 
stages/toddler/toilet-training/Pages/Toilet-Training-Children-with-Special-Needs.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/78X3-VAW9]. 
77. In contrast to the methods Kowalski used, the U.S. Department of Education has provided 
guidance on seclusion and restraint in school that states that such methods should not be used 
for the sake of convenience, should only be used to prevent the risk of imminent harm, and 
should be discontinued as soon as that risk is gone.  U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., RESTRAINT AND 
SECLUSION: RESOURCE DOCUMENT 14–15 (2012), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/seclusion/ 
restraints- and-seclusion-resources.pdf. 
78. Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 412 (stating “the . . . test first looks to the ends motivating 
the teacher’s actions and not the means undertaken to achieve those ends”). 
734 66 UCLA L. REV. 720 (2019) 
When other courts have evaluated these claims, they have similarly failed to 
interrogate schools’ pedagogical and disciplinary defenses.79  Courts almost never 
question the schools’ assertions, no matter how implausible—or, in some cases, 
nonexistent—they are.80  Consequently, schools evade liability for even severe and 
permanent harm.81 
 
79. In Flores v. School Board of DeSoto Parish, 116 F. App’x 504 (5th Cir. 2004), the court used the 
scantest of evidence to find a disciplinary need for the abuse of a student, Kevin Flores, by his 
coach, Clinton Wysinger.  In Flores, Wysinger accused Kevin of trying to skip his detention after 
Kevin used the restroom before returning to the detention room from a school assembly.  Id. at 
506.  When Kevin denied that accusation, Wysinger ordered Kevin to eat his lunch in the 
detention room, an order which Kevin questioned.  Id.  Wysinger then directed the other 
students out of the room and “took off his tie, rolled up his sleeves, and physically threatened 
Kevin.  When Kevin refused to fight Wysinger, he ordered Kevin to stand up, threw him against 
the wall, placed his hands around Kevin’s neck, and began to choke him while threatening 
further bodily harm.”  Id.  He also warned Kevin not to tell anyone about what had happened.  
Id.  Kevin nevertheless told the principal.  Id. at 507.  In response, the principal “volunteered that 
Wysinger could bench press 400 pounds” and recommended that Kevin be expelled when he 
refused to recant his story.  Id.  Kevin subsequently filed a Fourteenth Amendment action 
against the school, alleging a violation of his personal liberty and bodily integrity.  Id. at 509.  The 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s denial of his claim.  Id. at 511.  It 
determined that because Wysinger “believed that Kevin had been purposefully delaying or 
avoiding his return to the detention room. . . .  Wysinger’s acts apparently were meant to punish 
Kevin.”  Id.  In so reasoning, the court showed an eagerness to find a need without one actually 
being established.  In other words, the court had evidence before it that Wysinger had a 
subjective belief about Kevin’s misbehavior.  However, that subjective belief alone did not in fact 
establish a need for force.  Wysinger’s beliefs may have been wholly irrational.  Without more, 
the court simply took Wysinger’s subjective beliefs and translated them into an objective need 
for his assault of Kevin.  Id. at 511. 
80. T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010), is 
another example of a case where a court’s failure to interrogate a school’s pedagogical and 
disciplinary defenses resulted in the school evading liability despite the disturbing behavior of 
a teacher.  There, teacher Kathleen Garrett used inappropriate, sometimes dangerous, physical 
force against student T.W.  Id. at 594.  T.W. consequently brought a Fourteenth Amendment 
claim against the school.  Id. at 592–93.  T.W.’s claim failed, though, because the court accepted 
pretextual disciplinary reasons and inferred pedagogical reasons—where none existed—to 
justify the need for force factor of the analysis.  Id. at 600.  In one instance, for example, Garrett 
created the need for restraining T.W. when she “said something to T.W. to provoke him,” and 
T.W. responded by acting out.  Id. at 595.  Garrett, who at 300 pounds and nearly six feet tall was 
twice T.W.’s size, then “put T.W. on the floor with his face to the ground, straddled him so that 
her pelvic area was on top of his buttocks, and pulled his arms behind his back.”  Id.  A teacher’s 
aide in the classroom testified that Garrett would “‘pick and nag at [T.W.] until he would just get 
to the point where he just couldn’t take it anymore’” and then would restrain him.  Id. at 594.  
Yet the court found a need for force because T.W. had in fact responded to Garrett’s 
provocations and acted out.  Id. at 600.  The court also went so far as to infer a pedagogical need 
for another instance of abuse even though none existed.  In that instance, Garrett pinned T.W.’s 
hands behind his back in a manner that could cause asphyxiation for no apparent reason.  Id. at 
596.  The court nonetheless inferred a pedagogical reason for Garrett’s restraint.  Id. at 600.  It 
said “[t]here is no evidence as to what prompted Garrett to pin T.W.’s arms behind his back 
during the . . . incident, but the restraint occurred while Garrett was leading T.W. to the cool 
down room, which suggests that the restraint served some pedagogical objective.”  Id. at 600.  
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Once courts find a need for force, however credible or incredible, pretextual 
or not, they then consider the proportionality between the need for force and the 
amount used.  The courts, though, also fail to interrogate proportionality in a 
meaningful way.82  Consequently, students’ claims also fail on this prong of this 
analysis.   
In evaluating proportionality, courts examine the methods of discipline in 
isolation from its purpose.83  Therefore, they find even purposeless discipline 
proportional if the disciplinary method itself is not severe.  This analysis is 
problematic on two counts.  First, it is not a proportionality analysis; it is an analysis 
of the severity of the method only without regard for its need.  Second, it ignores the 
fact that use of any discipline or force without a purpose is, by definition, 
excessive.84 
In Domingo, for example, the court considered whether leaving a student 
strapped to a toilet for hours was excessive.85  Because the record contained expert 
evidence that such techniques were both “improper and counterproductive,” the 
techniques not only exceeded what was necessary to achieve the goal, but they 
worked against it.86  Yet the court found otherwise because  “the force that Kowalski 
applied—if she applied any force at all—was no more than arguably necessary to 
 
Similarly, in a separate incident, Garrett tripped T.W. without cause.  Id. at 596.  The court 
simply ignored the lack of the need for Garrett to trip T.W. and did not analyze the need for that 
instance of force at all.  Id. at 602. 
81. T.W., for example, developed PTSD after the treatment he suffered in Kathleen Garrett’s class.  
Id. at 596. 
82. See id. at 601; Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 413–14 (6th Cir. 2016). 
83. In T.W., the court conflated length of time with excessiveness, and it also disregarded the 
absence of evidence in the record of any need for some instances of force in order to find the 
proportionality prong satisfied.  610 F.3d at 601.  The court found Garrett’s straddling of T.W. 
not excessive because she got off him after he complied with her demands.  Id.  However, time 
cannot serve as a total substitute for excessiveness.  The excessiveness comes from doing more 
than is necessary.  Id.  In addition, even though the record in the case contained no evidence of a 
need for Garrett to pin T.W.’s arms behind his back, which made the force wholly unnecessary 
and therefore excessive, the court found it not to be excessive.  Id.  It did so by ignoring the lack 
of need for it and focusing on the minimal imposition of physical force.  Id. 
84. Merriam-Webster defines the word “excessive” as “exceeding what is usual, proper, necessary, 
or normal.”  Excessive, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, https://www.merriam-webster.com/ 
dictionary/excessive [https://perma.cc/B2MP-7VQQ].  In other contexts, notably the prisoners’ 
rights context, courts have concluded that the use of force without purpose is excessive.  E.g., 
Meredith v. Arizona, 523 F.2d 481, 484 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding a prisoner’s complaint of “an 
unprovoked assault and battery by a guard upon a prisoner known by the guard to be suffering 
from an attack of emphysema, by striking him in the solar plexus” stated a claim for a 
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process violation of personal liberty because the 
conduct could “be fairly characterized as intentional, unjustified, brutal, and offensive to human 
dignity.”). 
85. Domingo, 810 F.3d at 413–14 (6th Cir. 2016). 
86. Id. at 413. 
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keep these students safely on their toilets.”87  As such, the court found it not 
excessive.88 
C. Title IX Claims for Peer Sexual Harassment 
Title IX also provides at least a theoretical avenue for students who have 
suffered peer sexual harassment and abuse in school to hold the schools responsible 
for it.89  Title IX states that “no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, 
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance.”90  Under Title IX, schools are not held responsible for the students’ 
harassing or abusive behavior.91  Rather, in Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, the Supreme Court concluded that public schools are liable for peer 
sexual harassment when they are “deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of 
which they have actual knowledge, that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of access to the educational 
opportunities or benefits provided by the school.”92  In other words, they are held 
responsible for their own failures to intervene and address known, egregious peer 
sexual harassment. 
As a statutory scheme, Title IX fills in gaps in federal and state common law 
that otherwise leave students without legal protections from sex discrimination in 
education.93  Yet, the burden on the student to prove liability under the Davis 
standard is a heavy one.  Students fail to meet the Davis standard because courts’ 
assessment of the notice requirement demands that students show, among other 
things, that high-level school officials have very specific actual knowledge of 
substantial sexual harassment.94  In evaluating the deliberate indifference 
 
87. Id. at 414. 
88. Id. 
89. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).  Students can also bring Title IX claims 
for sexual harassment by teachers.  Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).  I 
have focused on peer sexual harassment claims because most sexual harassment in school is 
peer sexual harassment.  MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 2047. 
90. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018). 
91. Davis, 526 U.S. at 641–42. 
92. Id. at 650. 
93. “Congress enacted Title IX in 1972 with two principal objectives in mind: ‘[T]o avoid the use of 
federal resources to support discriminatory practices’ and ‘to provide individual citizens 
effective protection against those practices.’” Gebser, 524 U.S. at 286 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of 
Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979)). 
94. See, e.g., Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114 (10th Cir. 2008); Gebser v. 
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Doe v. Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s Cty., 
605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015); Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 926 (1999). 
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requirement, courts accept almost any school response to sexual harassment as 
sufficient.95  As a result, schools’ liability under Title IX for peer sexual harassment 
is severely limited. 
Beyond making schools’ knowledge of peer sexual harassment a predicate to 
liability, the Supreme Court gave little guidance in Davis as to what constitutes 
“known acts” of “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” peer harassment.96  
The Court did not say, for example, how precise students have to be in when 
providing that notice or whether actual knowledge of some sexual harassment gives 
rise to some obligation to investigate for additional sexual harassment.97  Lower 
federal courts have assessed these issues, however, and they have done so in ways 
that limit public school liability under Title IX.98 
In the Tenth Circuit, for example, not only must higher-level administrators 
have knowledge of students’ sexual harassment, but they must have specific 
information about it.99  Consequently, in the Tenth Circuit, Title IX imposes no 
 
95. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 629; Stiles v. Granger, 819 F.3d 834, 840–45 (6th Cir. 2016). 
96. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648, 650. 
97. See id.  Although in the predecessor Title IX case, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School 
District, the Court made clear that “a complaint from parents of other students charging only 
that [the teacher] had made inappropriate comments during class…was plainly insufficient to 
alert the principal to the possibility that [the teacher] was involved in a sexual relationship with a 
student,” it did not indicate what more would be required.  Gebser, 524 U.S. 274, 292 (1998).  In 
Davis, the Court said the “most obvious example” of peer sexual harassment violating Title IX 
would be “a case in which male students physically threaten their female peers everyday, 
successfully preventing the female students from using a particular school resource—an athletic 
field or a computer lab, for instance.  District administrators are well aware of the daily ritual, yet 
they deliberately ignore requests for aid from the female students wishing to use the resource.”  
Davis, 526 U.S. at 650–51.  Thus, together Gebser and Davis establish the ends of a continuum 
on which notice plainly is and is not sufficiently provided but do not elucidate the middle.  See 
also Kelly Dixon Furr, Note, How Well Are the Nation’s Children Protected From Peer 
Harassment in School? Title IX Liability in the Wake of Davis v. Monroe County Board of 
Education, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1573, 1597 (2000) (critiquing the Davis standard for failure to 
articulate its meaning, specifically pointing out that “[t]he Davis standard is also problematic 
because the Court did not give significant guidance regarding: (1) what constitutes severe and 
pervasive behavior to the point of interfering with education; (2) who must possess actual 
knowledge of the harassment; or (3) what constitutes reacting with deliberate indifference.  
Although OCR Guidelines and Title VII provide some guidance in applying the Davis standard, 
substantial uncertainties remain”). 
98. Catharine MacKinnon provides a compelling critique of public schools’ and universities’ limited 
liability in her article.  See MacKinnon, supra note 28. 
99. In Rost v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 School District, the Tenth Circuit effectively required that 
some precision is required to satisfy Title IX’s actual notice requirements. 511 F.3d 1114 (10th 
Cir. 2008).  In Rost, middle school student K.C. was repeatedly sexually harassed and assaulted 
by boys at her school.  Id. at 1117.  K.C., who had suffered a brain injury, lacked the language 
skills to say that the boys were sexually assaulting her.  Id.  Instead, she told the principal that the 
boys were “bothering” her.  K.C.’s mother also suspected a serious problem at school and 
pleaded with the school social worker and principal to find out what was happening to K.C. Id. 
at 1120.  Nevertheless, and despite K.C.’s inability to produce a more precise report, the court 
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liability for failures to address sexual harassment if students do not complain about 
it in specific terms.100  In such cases, schools can simply ignore it.101 
The Fourth Circuit has come to a somewhat different, but still stringent, 
interpretation of the Davis notice requirement that leaves students without much 
recourse in Title IX.102  It has interpreted the Davis notice requirement such that a 
school’s notice of some sexual harassment does not trigger an obligation to uncover 
potential additional sexual harassment, no matter how much reason a school might 
have to suspect it.103  In the Fourth Circuit, therefore, a school’s failure to investigate 
 
concluded that the school had no notice of K.C.’s sexual harassment because K.C.’s report was 
vague.  Id.  In the Tenth Circuit, therefore, the real possibility exists that large swaths of 
children—young children and children with disabilities, most notably—who lack the verbal 
capacity to tell someone of their sexual harassment in sophisticated or specific language will be 
virtually left without Title IX’s protections. 
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
101. While not every court has determined that knowledge of peer sexual harassment must be so 
precise, that some—like the Tenth Circuit—have done so reflects a strain of Title IX 
jurisprudence that strongly unbounds many school officials’ decisionmaking.  See infra note 103 
(discussing Kauhako v. Hawaii Board of Education). 
102. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159 (4th Cir. 2015).  Doe involved the sexual harassment of one 
student, J.D., by another, M.O., that culminated in incidences of forced sexual acts in the school 
bathroom.  Id. at 163.  The school addressed some, but not all, of the harassment J.D. suffered.  
Id. at 162.  The school defended its failure to address every instance of the sexual harassment that 
J.D. endured on the basis that it did not know of some of the individual instances of harassment.  
Id. at 168.  J.D. argued that to the extent the school lacked notice of some of the sexual 
harassment, that lack of notice was due to the school’s failure to investigate after receiving notice 
of the other sexual harassment.  Id. at 168.  The Fourth Circuit rejected J.D.’s argument.  Id. at 
167–68. 
103. Id.  Not only did the Fourth Circuit limit public school Title IX liability by narrowly interpreting 
the meaning of the notice requirement, but it also did so by way of problematic reasoning.  In 
Doe, the Fourth Circuit limited the public schools’ liability by interpreting the Davis notice 
requirement in a way not mandated by Davis.  In Davis, the Supreme Court stated that schools 
must be “deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment.”  
Davis, 526 U.S. at 647.  The Court, however, did not limit the events or circumstances under 
which that notice can arise once schools know of some sexual harassment.  See id.  Contrary to 
the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion in Doe, therefore, the Davis standard does not preclude the 
possibility that notice of some sexual harassment would give rise to schools’ obligation to try to 
determine the existence of additional sexual harassment.  Davis, 526 U.S. at 646–47.  Indeed, 
requiring that the schools investigate the extent of the problem upon learning of some sexual 
harassment also makes sense because children are often reluctant to report it.  See supra note 15 
and accompanying text; D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 
F.2d 1364, 1381 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[T]he reluctance of children to disclose sexual abuse is generally 
acknowledged.”).  Moreover, to underscore the point that the Doe court’s heightened notice 
requirements is not the mandatory interpretation of Davis’s notice requirement, at least one 
federal district court, the Hawaii District Court in Kauhako v. Hawaii Board of Education, 
adopted a less narrow interpretation.  No. CV 13-00567 DKW-KJM, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
119736, at *7–8 (D. Haw. Dec. 19, 2016).  In Kauhako, a student, Mariana Doe, was raped 
repeatedly by another student in school, Ruston Tom.  Id. at *2.  On a motion to dismiss Doe’s 
Title IX claim, the school argued that the first rape did not provide notice of subsequent rapes.  
Id. at *7–8.  The court rejected these arguments.  Id.  It said that the amount of information the 
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the full extent of a student’s sexual harassment will insulate it from liability for not 
addressing any it did not expressly know about, even if it had ample reason to 
suspect it.104  Schools can thus effectively decide to cherry pick which sexual 
harassment they respond to, and Title IX will not constrain them under the Fourth 
Circuit analysis. 
Even when schools have sufficient knowledge of peer sexual harassment, they 
can easily evade liability based on courts’ interpretations of the Title IX deliberate 
indifference standard.  In Davis, the Supreme Court said that to meet that standard, 
a school “must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner that is not 
clearly unreasonable.”105  Schools, therefore, can theoretically respond to student 
sexual harassment in ways that are arguably unreasonable, and they will not be held 
liable under Title IX. 
This low threshold for responding to sexual harassment has meant that 
courts have found that virtually any action by the schools will satisfy Title IX, 
regardless of how ineffective or counterproductive they are.  In some cases, 
schools’ interventions have done nothing or exacerbated harm.106  In other 
cases, schools sometimes responded to the sexual harassment and sometimes did 
not.107  Interventions that at best do not work and at worst cause more harm to a 
child are not reasonable.  A school’s response to some instances of sexual 
harassment should not reasonably inoculate its inaction in response to other 
 
school official must possess need only be “enough knowledge” of the harassment that “it 
reasonably could have responded with remedial measures.”  Id. at *5 (citation omitted). 
104. Doe, 605 F. App’x at 167–68. 
105. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649. 
106. In Doe v. Board of Education, for example, the school responded to M.O.’s repeated harassment 
of J.D. in both ineffective and counterproductive ways.  605 F. App’x at 162–63.  When the boys 
were in fourth grade, the school moved J.D.’s desk away from M.O.’s desk and gave M.O. an in-
school suspension, but the harassment continued.  Id.  Then, although the school knew of the 
harassment, it created further opportunity for harassment by placing the boys in the same fifth-
grade classroom.  Id. at 162.  Also that year, because the school knew the sexual harassment 
occurred in the bathroom, it gave J.D. a peer escort to the bathroom.  Id. at 163.  That 
intervention, however, only caused J.D. more suffering because other students teased him about 
the escort, resulting in humiliation and exacerbating his emotional harm.  Id. 
107. In Stiles v. Granger, a student, D.S., was repeatedly harassed over a period of years by multiple 
other students.  819 F.3d 834, 840–45 (6th Cir. 2016).  The school sometimes responded to the 
harassment and sometimes did not.  Id. at 840–45.  The opinion is replete with instances where 
the school did almost nothing in response to the harassment.  For example, the court noted that 
the “record does not indicate whether [the assistant principal, who received a report that a 
student was calling D.S. “gay” and “homo”] investigated the complaint.”  Id. at 841.  In another 
incident, a student called D.S. “‘pussy,’ jumped on him, and punched him in the mouth.”  Id. at 
844–45.  The school did not punish this student because the assistant principal “testified that 
[she] ‘assumed . . . mom handled the situation.’”  Id. at 845.  However, because the school 
responded sometimes, the court found the school did not act in a clearly unreasonable way.  Id. 
at 848–49. 
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instances of sexual harassment.  Yet, courts still find these responses not clearly 
unreasonable, and they satisfy the deliberate indifference standard.108  These highly 
discretionary standards, therefore, create high thresholds for school Title IX 
liability, and students struggle to hold schools liable for peer sexual harassment. 
D. The Resulting Civil Rights Vacuum in Schools 
Whether students suffer physical, verbal, or sexual harms in school, the 
Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX do little to protect them.  Collectively, 
therefore, these laws shield schools from liability instead of protect students.  
Consequently, students who are sexually assaulted by other students, as in Middle 
Bucks, or strapped for hours to a toilet by their teachers, as in Domingo, cannot 
expect to find legal protection in school.  That is not to say, though, that students 
never succeed on any claim for harms suffered in school.  They have at times.109  
However, the law does not consistently—or even often—protect them because the 
courts assess their claims in ways that make it difficult to hold schools accountable.  
Civil rights enforcement for students under these laws simply proves elusive.  As an 
aggregate matter, courts’ interpretations of students’ Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title IX claims for physical, verbal, and sexual abuse has created a civil rights 
vacuum in the public schools. 
 
108. To be fair, the courts have also said that schools do not have to remedy the sexual harassment.  
Porto v. Town of Tewksbury, 488 F.3d 67, 73 (1st Cir. 2007) (“[A] claim that the school system 
could or should have done more is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference”); Vance 
v. Spencer Cty. Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253, 260 (6th Cir. 2000)  (“The recipient is not required 
to ‘remedy’ sexual harassment nor ensure that students conform their conduct to certain 
rules, but rather, ‘the recipient must merely respond to known peer harassment in a manner 
that is not clearly unreasonable.’” (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 648–49)).  This concession 
has practical value.  Even the most thoughtful interventions aimed at addressing and 
preventing sexual harassment might not work.  It is easy to imagine a scenario in which a 
school responds to sexual harassment by allowing the victim to choose to attend another 
public school or transferring the perpetrator to another school, which would seemingly work to 
separate the students such that sexual harassment would not occur in school.  It is also easy to 
imagine the perpetrator tracking the victim down and continuing the harassment at school 
sporting events or other school-related events.  Genuine efforts aimed at ending the sexual 
harassment, therefore, might not all be effective.  Such efforts, though, are a far cry from the 
patently ineffective, nonexistent, or even counterproductive and harmful interventions used by 
the schools in Doe and Stiles.  Those efforts nevertheless satisfied Title IX because virtually any 
intervention is sufficient under the deliberate indifference requirement of Davis. 
109. See, e.g., supra notes 68, 103 and accompanying text. 
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II. THE MISCONCEPTIONS JUSTIFYING PUBLIC SCHOOLS’  
LIMITED LIABILITY 
Were the justifications for public schools’ limited liability satisfactory, then 
students’ limited legal protections in school would be a tragic, but unavoidable, 
fact of school life.  Instead, this limited jurisprudence is rooted in the courts’ 
misconceptions about both families and schools.110  The courts rely heavily on 
these misconceptions to justify school liability limits.  Students’ limited legal 
protections within the school civil rights vacuum, therefore, is unwarranted.  As 
is explained in Part III, these misconceptions and consequent legal limits also result 
in at least three serious and troubling consequences. 
A. The Family as Totally Responsible for Protecting Children 
When evaluating students’ Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claims, 
courts rely on a misconception about the family’s role with respect to their 
children.111  Specifically, they rely on the idea that the family is properly responsible 
for all the care of children even when children are in school.112  The problem, 
however, is that the idea that families are in fact solely responsible for and capable of 
all this care, all the time, even during the school day, is inaccurate and factually 
untrue. 
This misconception is apparent in Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect 
cases.  There, courts tie the state duty to protect individuals to a special relationship 
arising from physical custody and the consequent need for state caretaking.113  In 
 
110. The courts at time openly work to limit schools’ liability.  In the Fourteenth Amendment cases, 
the courts frequently note that they are looking to limit Fourteenth Amendment liability.  E.g., 
T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2010); Lee v. Pine Bluff Sch. Dist., 
472 F.3d 1026, 1032 (8th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment was not designed to 
provide relief in all cases where the State’s functionaries fail to take action that might have 
averted a serious harm.  The constitutional duties derived from substantive due process analysis 
are carefully circumscribed.”).  Therefore, the court concluded that the school had no duty to 
protect and therefore was not liable for the death of a student, who became very ill while on a 
school-supervised band trip but for whom the school staff sought no medical help despite 
knowing about the illness.  Lee, 472 F.3d at 1032.  Similarly, in the Title IX context, the Supreme 
Court once found schools could be liable under Title IX while explaining how its standard 
served to limit schools’ exposure to it.  Davis, 526 U.S. at 649 (noting that “there is no reason why 
courts, on a motion to dismiss for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict, could not 
identify a response as not ‘clearly unreasonable’ as a matter of law”).  Lower courts have followed 
in these efforts.  See infra Subpart II.B. 
111. See infra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
112. See infra notes 115–116 and accompanying text. 
113. E.g., Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming the denial of a 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claim, stating “unlike imprisonment or commitment to 
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the school context, although courts acknowledge some form of physical custody 
exists because of mandatory attendance laws, they point out that families—and not 
schools—are still ultimately responsible for and capable of children’s care.114  The 
courts rely on this notion of family caretaking to conclude that schools have neither 
a caretaking nor, therefore, a custodial relationship with students that gives rise to a 
duty to protect them.115 
The courts thus treat the responsibility for the caretaking and protection of 
children as a binary choice.  Because parents protect and care for children, schools 
do not have the responsibility to do so.  Parents, they say, have this ability to protect 
children even when they are in school because the children “remain resident in 
their home . . . [so] they may turn to persons unrelated to the state for help.”116  
Moreover, parents can protect children because they retain “the discretion to 
remove the child from classes as they see fit.”117  When children are nonetheless 
harmed in school, parents still have virtually sole responsibility for addressing the 
harm. 
However, the idea that parents can do all the work of protecting and caring for 
children, even when they are in school, fails for four reasons.118  First, the very 
 
a mental institution, compulsory school attendance does not restrict a student’s liberty such that 
neither the child nor his parents are unable to attend to the child’s basic human needs.  Despite 
mandatory school attendance laws, the parents, not the state, remain the child’s primary 
caretakers.”); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) (denying a 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claim by a boy with intellectual disabilities who was 
sexually assaulted in the high school shower because “[p]ublic school attendance does not 
render a child’s guardians unable to care of the child’s basic needs.  In this regard, public schools 
are simply not analogous to prisons and mental institutions.”); see also infra notes 115–116. 
114. See infra notes 115–116. 
115. See, e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting a 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claim by a student who was raped by a school janitor 
because “[p]arents remain the primary source of the basic needs of their children”); D.R. ex rel. 
L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d Cir. 1992) (“Our 
view that parents remain the primary caretakers, despite [children’s] presence in school, is not 
affected by Section 13-1317 which grants Pennsylvania teachers and principals in loco parentis 
status.”); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 257, 272 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claim of students who had been sexually abused by a 
public school teacher because “parents still retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, 
sheltering, and caring for the child”). 
116. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1372; see also Doe v. Hillsboro, 113 F.3d at 1415 (quoting Ingraham v. 
Wright 430 U.S. 651, 670 (1977)) (“Even while at school, the child brings with him the support 
of family and friends.”). 
117. Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371. 
118. This concept of families as inhabitants of the private sphere, where caretaking work is done, as 
opposed to public sphere entities, which do not do caretaking, is also reflective of and integral to 
the false dichotomy of public and private that has been explored by feminists.  MAXINE EICHNER, 
THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND AMERICA’S POLITICAL IDEALS 5 (2010); 
MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 151–52 
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existence of civil rights statutes like Title IX demonstrates that the notion that 
parents can protect students while they are in school is false.  Title IX was enacted 
for the purpose of protecting children from and “prohibit[ing] sex discrimination 
at all levels of education.”119  If parents were fully capable of protecting their 
children from sexual harassment in school, then Title IX would not have been and 
would not still be needed.  Title IX is the embodiment of the idea that parents alone 
cannot protect their children.120 
Second, state statutes also require schools to do caretaking.121  Numerous 
states have laws explicitly requiring teachers and other school staff to report 
suspected child abuse and neglect.122  In other words, these states require schools to 
take care of children by acting to protect them from child abuse and neglect.  
Third, courts, including the Supreme Court, not only acknowledge that 
schools take care of and protect children in school, but they also use this caretaking 
work to justify deference to schools’ suppression of students’ constitutional 
rights.123  For example, the Supreme Court has said that public schools have a role 
in protecting students from the ravages of the drug abuse problem.124  
 
(2005); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191–93 (1989); 
Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67 TUL. L. REV. 955, 997–1002 
(1993); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 
(1985).  Feminists have effectively shown that families are not fully private but instead are highly 
regulated.  Id.  Similarly, the public/private dichotomy also fails because public schools are 
private in that they do caretaking work and lack regulation.  Suski, The Privacy of the Public 
School, supra note 29 (contending that public schools have privacy, in the sense developed in 
feminist theory, because they lack regulation for failing to address harms to children and 
because they do caretaking work).  
119. 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh). 
120. See id.; see also Paul M. Anderson, Symposium, Title IX at Forty: An Introduction and Historical 
Review of Forty Legal Developments That Shaped Gender Equity Law, 22 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
325 (2012) (explaining that Title IX was originally enacted to address sex discrimination in 
education, not athletics). 
121. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
122. These states include Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, California, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, 
Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, 
MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2015). 
123. E.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 665 (1995) (stating that because a school’s 
suspicionless search of student athletes was “undertaken in furtherance of the government’s 
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its 
care,” it was appropriate and did not violate the Fourth Amendment”); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682–83 (1986) (reasoning that because it is the “role and purpose” of the 
public schools to teach students the “habits and manners of civility,” they can suppress students’ 
vulgar speech without violating the First Amendment). 
124. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 408 (2007) (finding that the protecting students from 
the problem of drug use justified the suppression of speech that could be construed as drug-
promoting); Acton, 515 U.S. at 665 (noting that “the most significant element in this case is the 
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Consequently, public schools can infringe on students’ First and Fourth 
Amendment rights to protect them in ways other state actors could not.125  So, 
while schools do not have the kind of full custody that parents enjoy, they do fall in a 
middle ground because they are not without custodial and caretaking 
responsibilities.126  The law gives them the benefit of the middle ground to limit 
student rights, but it does not use that middle ground status to expand student’s 
rights such that schools are obliged to protect them in school. 
Fourth, the facts of the cases in which students seek redress for harm in school 
belie the notion that parents can protect their children while they are in 
school.  Parents cannot do all the protection and caretaking of children because 
they are not present in school.127  If parents were fully able to care for and protect 
their children while they are in school, then reason suggests both that children 
would rarely be harmed in school because parents would step in to protect them, 
and parents would not have to beseech schools to intervene to do it for them.  
 
first we discussed: that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s 
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its 
care” to justify its conclusion that the suspicionless search of student athletes did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment). 
125. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664–65; Morse, 551 U.S. at 408. 
126. See D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1371 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (“Although a student is not held in school under shackles, there is substantial 
compulsion associated with schooling.”); see also Suski, The Privacy of the Public School, supra 
note 29, at 477–80 (discussing schools’ custody of children as occupying a middle ground and its 
implications). 
127. Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 190 (2013) (“[A] parent’s immediate ability to protect his child 
is significantly curtailed during the time the child is in the physical custody of school officials.  
During that time, the State may well be the only caregiver to which children may turn to for 
help.”) (dissent).  Significantly, parents of children with disabilities face particularly large 
obstacles to protecting their children in school.  Some children with disabilities cannot tell their 
parents of their harm because their disabilities prevent them from doing so.  E.g., Middle Bucks, 
972 F.2d at 1381; Domingo, 810 F.3d at 412–13.  For example, one of the girls who was sexually 
assaulted in Middle Bucks had both extremely limited articulation and a severe hearing 
impairment.  Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1381.  She had literal physical impediments affecting her 
ability to get a parent to help her.  Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1381.  Similarly, in Domingo v. 
Kowalski, Marsha Kowalski restrained, gagged, and otherwise abused children with severe 
disabilities who likely would have had difficulty telling their parents of their abuse in school.  
Domingo, 810 F.3d at 412–13.  Parents of children like these cannot protect them from harms 
when they do not know about it.  Further, regardless of disability status, children underreport 
harassment and abuse.  E.g., HILL & KEARL, supra note 11, at 8 (specifically pointing to 
underreporting of cyber sexual harassment); see also Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d. at 1382 (“In a 
poignant revelation of her vulnerability, D.R. stated that she was afraid that if she complained 
about the brutality to anyone and was removed from the classroom, she would have nowhere to 
go.”).  If their children cannot or will not tell them about the abuse, then the parents will not 
know about it, let alone be able to do anything about it. 
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Instead, parents, like the parents of Brittany and Emily Morrow, implore the 
schools to protect their children.128 
B. The Expertise of the Schools, the Ignorance of the Courts 
Courts also rely on the misconception that schools have such particular 
expertise in matters of pedagogy and discipline that it justifies a near-total 
deference to public school decisionmaking in these areas.129  This expertise-
based deference appears explicitly in Title IX cases.130  It also manifests implicitly in 
Fourteenth Amendment cases, where courts accept even the most implausible or 
nonexistent pedagogical or disciplinary reasons proffered by schools without 
scrutiny.131  The reliance on this expertise-based deference is exaggerated, however, 
because courts justify their refusal to scrutinize schools’ defenses even when no 
such expertise is needed.132 
In the Title IX context, the Supreme Court has endorsed a deferential 
approach to schools’ expertise on matters of pedagogy and discipline.  In Davis, the 
Court cautioned lower courts to “refrain from second guessing the disciplinary 
decisions made by school administrators.”133  The Court issued this warning 
 
128. Morrow, 719 F.3d 160, 166 (2013).  When Emily and Brittany Morrow suffered repeated 
bullying by fellow student Shaquana Anderson, the school simply refused to address it 
despite their parents’ pleas for intervention.  Id.  Even when Emily and Brittany’s parents 
provided the school with a no-contact order that a court imposed against Shaquana in an 
attempt to get the school to protect the girls, the school did not follow it.  Id. at 164. 
129. See infra notes 136, 138 and accompanying text. 
130. See infra note 136 and accompanying text. 
131. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
132. For other critiques of courts’ use of this idea to defer to school authority in First and Fourth 
Amendment cases, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Constitution in Authoritarian Institutions, 32 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 441 (1999). 
133. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999) (citing New 
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342 n.9 (1985)).  In T.L.O., the Court decided that schools have 
more deference to suppress students’ Fourth Amendment rights than other state actors and that 
schools could search students upon reasonable suspicion and without probable cause and a 
warrant.  T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 347.  The majority also responded to Justice Stevens’s concern that 
reasonable suspicion might not be a high enough standard to justify a search to uncover 
violations of “trivial” school rules.  Id. at 342 n.9.  The Court refused to delve into the question of 
which school rules could be deemed trivial.  It said when schools make a rule to prohibit, it 
“presumably reflects a judgment on the part of school officials that such conduct is destructive of 
school order or of a proper educational environment.  Absent any suggestion that the rule 
violates some substantive constitutional guarantee, the courts should, as a general matter, defer 
to that judgment and refrain from attempting to distinguish between rules that are important to 
the preservation of order in the schools and rules that are not.”  Id.  Yet even there the Court 
imposed some check on schools’ discretion, the requirement of individualized suspicion before 
a search can be lawfully conducted.  Id. 
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because it was anxious to avoid hamstringing schools’ disciplinary discretion.134  
This deference to schools’ disciplinary decisionmaking thus helped to justify the 
deliberate indifference standard, which the Court said would be satisfied if schools 
responded to sexual harassment in ways not clearly unreasonable.135  The lower 
courts have accordingly been mindful of deferring to schools’ expertise when 
assessing whether their responses to sexual harassment were not clearly 
unreasonable, and this deference has also served to limit public school liability.136 
The courts also show a reluctance or refusal to question school 
decisionmaking in Fourteenth Amendment personal liberty and bodily integrity 
cases.137  Although the courts are less explicit about their deference to school 
decisionmaking in this context, it manifests implicitly when the courts fail to 
question schools’ assertions of even implausible pedagogical or disciplinary goals 
and methods.138  This failure to scrutinize even implausible or nonexistent 
disciplinary reasons for physical abuse of children leads to their conclusions that 
the schools are not liable for the harms.139 
On first consideration, the idea of relying on schools’ expertise in matters of 
pedagogy and discipline seems like a reasonable basis for deferring to school 
 
134. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (“We stress that our conclusion here—that recipients may be liable for 
their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer sexual harassment—does not mean that 
recipients can avoid liability only by purging their schools of actionable peer harassment or 
that administrators must engage in particular disciplinary action.”). 
135. Id. at 649. 
136. In Doe v. Board of Education of Prince George’s County, 605 F. App’x 159, 165 (2015), for 
example, the Fourth Circuit showed its reticence to question schools’ decisionmaking.  When 
discussing whether the school could have done more or taken other steps to address the sexual 
harassment of the student, J.D., it approvingly referenced the district court’s note about courts’ 
“obligation to refrain from ‘micromanaging’ the school’s operations.”  Id. at 165 n.9.  Based in 
part on this idea, it concluded that the school’s actions “were not clearly unreasonable.”  Id. at 
168. 
137. See infra note 138 and accompanying text. 
138. For example, in Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 412 (6th Cir. 2016), evidence in the record 
showed that the teacher’s stated pedagogical and disciplinary reasons for restraining a child to a 
toilet for hours at a time would work against the goal of toilet training, but the court did not 
incorporate this information into its reasoning or in any way question the plausibility of the 
stated goal.  In T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, 610 F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 
2010), the school staff member, Kathleen Garrett, not only used harmful and potentially life-
threatening disciplinary techniques, but she also knew they could be harmful.  Yet the court did 
not question the asserted pedagogical reasons or methods.  Id. at 600–01.  In Flores v. School 
Board of DeSoto Parish, 116 F. App’x 504, 506 (5th Cir. 2004), in which the coach challenged the 
student to fight, threw him against a wall, choked him, and then threatened him if he told 
anyone, it takes some imagination to accept these methods as proper or serving a pedagogical or 
disciplinary goal.  Nonetheless, the court said that “so long as it is possible to construe the force 
as an attempt to serve pedagogical objectives,” it would do so.  Id. at 510.  And so it did.  Id. 
139. See supra Subpart I.B. 
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decisionmaking.  Indeed, it is reasonable in a number of contexts.140  Schools 
unquestionably have more experience handling matters of pedagogy and discipline 
given their daily work on these issues.141  Yet schools’ expertise fails to justify the 
courts’ near-total lack of scrutiny into schools’ failure to protect children from or 
their tolerance those harms for at least three reasons. 
First, “pedagogy” and “discipline” are such broad categories that they could 
encompass almost anything.  They comprise schools’ general purpose for being.142  
So, if courts defer to schools in these areas, they will rarely, if ever, find occasion to 
scrutinize the actions of schools.143 
Second, the courts do not need expertise in pedagogy and discipline in 
order to analyze some such assertions by the schools.144  No particular expertise is 
needed to analyze the utter lack of a pedagogical or disciplinary goal or a 
manufactured one.145  Take, for example, the case of Domingo v. Kowalski, in 
which teacher Marsha Kowalski gagged and bound her students, leaving some 
 
140. For example, the Every Student Succeeds Act gives states and their educational agencies the 
flexibility to develop their own challenging educational standards and goals.  20 U.S.C. § 6311.  
Crafting such goals requires educational expertise and experience.  So, deferring to the expertise 
of state educational experts for the development of these plans makes sense insofar as persons 
without that expertise would be ill-equipped to create the plans.  The courts’ acknowledgement 
and deference to expertise is also justified as a matter of efficiency and error avoidance.  See infra 
note 144. 
141. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
142. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 507 (1969) (stating that schools are 
“educating the young for citizenship” (quoting W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 
624, 637 (1943))); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831, 839 (2002) (noting schools are 
“responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety” in upholding suspicionless searches 
of all students participating in extracurricular activities). 
143. For example, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit will not examine schools’ actions that 
harm children not only when it plausibly is the result of a pedagogical or disciplinary decision, 
but also when it is merely capable of being construed as such.  Flores, 116 F. App’x at 510. 
144. Scott A. Moss has argued that the reliance on the idea that courts’ deference to schools in First 
Amendment cases is a function of concerns about the information costs and resulting error 
costs.  Scott A. Moss, Symposium, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary 
Note About Excessive Institutional Tailoring of First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REV. 
1635, 1658 (2007).  He points out that in “institutions involving specialized knowledge, such as 
schools and prisons, the information costs of adjudication may be especially high.  Litigants 
must expend more time and expense explaining the case to the court, and the court must 
expend more time and effort learning the information necessary to make a good ruling.  When 
information costs (or any other transaction costs) are high, then error costs will be high as well, 
because with the courts likely having less information when making their rulings, the odds of 
erroneous rulings are greater.”  Id. at 1658.  However, no such information costs exist for certain 
pedagogical or disciplinary decisions, most notably those that lack an implausible basis or any 
basis at all.  For such decisions, judicial review occurs without informational costs. 
145. Id.; see also supra Part II.B. 
748 66 UCLA L. REV. 720 (2019) 
restrained on toilets for hours at a time.146  There, the court needed no particular 
expertise to find there was no need for that force.147  Moreover, even if expertise is 
needed in other, less egregious cases to determine the validity of asserted 
pedagogical or disciplinary methods, courts could simply hear that evidence 
instead of taking their current approach of near-total deference.148 
Finally, calling into question schools’ baseless or implausible pedagogical and 
disciplinary justifications does nothing to undermine their broader pedagogical 
and disciplinary expertise.149  To the contrary, refusing to defer to implausible or 
nonexistent pedagogical and disciplinary assertions shows a respect for the valid 
exercise of such expertise by not grouping the implausible and nonexistent with the 
actual and the valid.  It bolsters the strength of deference to this expertise when it is 
given.150  While as a general matter courts’ concerns about engaging in matters over 
which they have little expertise has validity because it could, among other things, 
lead to decisionmaking errors, they have taken the deference so far in these cases as 
to make review almost meaningless.151 
 
146. See supra notes 69–70.  Similarly, in T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. School Board of Seminole County, 610 
F.3d 588 (11th Cir. 2010), abusive teacher Kathleen Garrett had only pretextual, or in some 
instances no, reason for restraining student T.W., who was at least half her size, with her full 
weight.  See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.  Courts need no particular expertise to 
evaluate such methods as improper. 
147. A court does not need expertise to evaluate the need for force so extreme that it violates basic 
social norms.  Even less extreme forms of discipline now violate the disciplinary norms of most 
parents.  For example, a recent study found that far fewer parents spank or otherwise physically 
discipline their children than did twenty years ago.  Rebecca M. Ryan et al., Socioeconomic Gaps 
in Parents’ Discipline Strategies From 1998–2011, 138 PEDIATRICS 1 (2016).  Twenty years ago, 46 
percent of parents at the median income level endorsed physical discipline, but that rate of 
endorsement dropped to 21 percent by 2011.  Id.  These changes reflect the changing norms that 
militate against the use of physical discipline on children. 
148. However, even when courts do hear this kind of evidence on the validity of pedagogical and 
disciplinary methods, they ignore it and defer to the schools.  See supra notes 74–77 and 
accompanying text. 
149. See Chemerinsky, supra note 132, at 461 (critiquing, for example, the Supreme Court decision to 
allow schools to conduct random, suspicionless drug tests of students out of deference to 
schools’ authority and expertise because not “forcing students to submit to drug tests would not 
undermine the overall authority of the schools”). 
150. Id. (“The Supreme Court’s assumption is that virtually any judicial review is inconsistent with 
the authority of these institutions [prisons, the military, and the public schools].  Yet, there is no 
reason why this is so, especially because authority and expertise are factors that courts can use as 
part of judicial analysis.”). 
151. Moss, supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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C. The Burdens of Regulations on the Public Schools 
In the Title IX context, public schools’ limited liability also finds its roots in 
courts’ concerns about imposing burdens on schools.152  The judicial handwringing 
over the notion of schools’ burdens began in the Supreme Court even as it 
concluded that schools could be found liable under Title IX for peer harassment.153  
In Davis, the Court expressly worried about the burdens associated with the 
imposition of Title IX liability on schools.154  Unsurprisingly, then, these concerns 
have surfaced in the lower courts and served as a basis for limiting schools’ liability 
under Title IX.155  Yet, the idea has little merit and none that justifies limiting 
schools’ Title IX liability.156  Moreover, at this point, there is little risk that more 
scrutiny into schools’ responses to sexual harassment will translate into excess 
judicial interventionism given that the starting point for such scrutiny is at so low a 
level now. 
In Davis, the Supreme Court expressed skepticism about imposing Title IX 
liability on schools because schools already had to function under the heavy weight 
of regulations.157  The Court was clear on this point, stating “we acknowledge that 
school administrators shoulder substantial burdens as a result of the legal 
constraints on their disciplinary authority.”158  It consequently took pains to explain 
repeatedly how it was not adding to these burdens and was limiting schools’ Title 
IX liability.159  It explained how schools’ liability was limited to instances of sexual 
harassment over which the schools have control.160  Further, it described that the 
“standard set out here is sufficiently flexible to account for both the level of 
disciplinary authority available to the school and for the potential liability arising 
from certain forms of disciplinary action.”161  The standard, therefore, seeks to 
protect schools from excess liability as much or more than it protects students from 
sexual harassment.162 
 
152. See supra Subpart II.B. 
153. Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999). 
154. Id. 
155. See supra Subpart II.B. 
156. See supra Subpart II.A. 
157. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 644–45. 
161. Id. at 649. 
162. Catharine MacKinnon notes “[t]he choice of deliberate indifference as a liability 
standard . . . rather than being based on equality reasoning, was designed to keep the schools 
from being taken by surprise in being held responsible when students’ education was disrupted 
or destroyed by sexual harassment.”  MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 2087.  “The test is designed 
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More specifically, the Court sought to limit Title IX liability and preserve 
schools’ disciplinary flexibility through the evaluation of the actual notice and 
deliberate indifference standard.163  With respect to the actual notice standard, the 
Court said that the standard would “limit a [school’s] damages liability to 
circumstances wherein the recipient exercises substantial control over both the 
harasser and the context in which the known harassment occurs.”164  The Court 
was also explicit about how the deliberate indifference standard would limit public 
schools’ liability.  The Court said that to enable schools to “continue to enjoy 
[disciplinary] flexibility,” they need only respond to sexual harassment “in a 
manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”165  It stressed that its “conclusion here—
that recipients may be liable for their deliberate indifference to known acts of peer 
sexual harassment—does not mean that . . . administrators must engage in any 
particular disciplinary action.”166 
The majority in Davis was echoing and responding to the dissent’s stronger, 
bordering-on-apoplectic concerns about the effect of Title IX liability for peer 
sexual harassment on schools.167  The dissent viewed the imposition of Title IX 
liability for peer sexual harassment as sure to result in near-cataclysmic burdens for 
schools.168  First, it said the schools would be even more limited in their disciplinary 
decisions than they already were as a result of the Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez, 
which concluded that schools must provide some procedural due process before 
suspending or expelling a student from school.169  Second, it predicted any Title IX 
liability would lead to a “flood” of litigation against the schools.170  It said that the 
schools would be “beset with litigation from every side,”171 and thus would face 
“crushing financial liability.”172  Finally, the dissent voiced concerns about the 
 
to protect authoritative institutions (which children are in essence compelled to attend) from 
youngsters sexually victimized in, and often by, those institutions.”  Id. at 2089. 
163. Davis, 526 U.S. at 648. 
164. Id. at 645. 
165. Id. at 648–49. 
166. Id. at 648. 
167. Id. at 665.  Justice Kennedy, who wrote the dissent in Davis, also argued that schools do not exert 
all that much control over the students’ behavior and certainly not so much that they should face 
liability under Title IX for it.  Id. 
168. Id. at 681. 
169. Id. at 665 (“[F]ederal law imposes constraints on school disciplinary actions . . . for example, that 
due process requires, ‘at the very minimum,’ that a student facing suspension ‘be given some 
kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing.’” (quoting Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 
(1975))). 
170. Id. at 680. 
171. Id. at 682. 
172. Id. at 672.  It critiqued the majority for asserting it had done anything to limit that flood saying its 
“limitations on peer sexual harassment suits cannot hope to contain” it.  Id. at 680. 
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practical burdens the majority decision would impose on schools.  It pointedly 
warned about the “practical obstacles . . . in ensuring that thousands of immature 
students conform their conduct to acceptable norms.”173 
Given the cautionary tone of the Davis majority and the strident tone of its 
dissent, lower courts have predictably echoed the Supreme Court’s concerns about 
the regulatory burdens on schools in evaluating Title IX claims.  In one exemplary 
case, Hill v. Cundiff, the Eleventh Circuit worried about adding to schools’ burdens 
even as it considered whether a school could be held liable for the rape of one 
student, Doe, by another, CJC, as the result of a school staff member’s plot to 
use Doe as bait to catch CJC in the act of sexual assault.174  Similarly, in another case, 
Doe v. Board of Education, in which student M.O. sexually harassed and assaulted 
another student, J.D., the Fourth Circuit expressed its concerns about the burdens 
of imposing liability on schools when it considered a student’s Title IX claim.175  It 
quoted the lower court’s observation that if the school’s response to the sexual 
harassment in question, some of which exacerbated the victim’s harm, constituted 
a clearly unreasonable response, then “‘nothing short of expulsion of every student 
accused of misconduct involving sexual overtones would protect school systems 
from liability or damages.’”176  As such, it affirmed the district court’s ruling in favor 
of the school.177 
These ideas about schools’ burdens, however, suffer from several 
misconceptions.  First, disciplinary regulations, Goss, and Davis have not burdened 
the public schools’ disciplinary flexibility.178  To the contrary, schools have had such 
flexibility in their disciplinary decisionmaking that suspensions and expulsions 
 
173. Id. at 666. 
174. Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 969–70 (11th Cir. 2015).  It used the Supreme Court’s concerns in 
Davis about “ensur[ing] school districts are not financially crippled” and its effort to “guard 
against the imposition of ‘sweeping liability’” to justify its decision that the Title IX actual notice 
requirement means actual notice of “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” sexual 
harassment,” as opposed to actual knowledge of “substantial risk” of the same.  Id. 
175. Doe v. Bd. of Educ., 605 F. App’x 159, 165–66 (4th Cir. 2015). 
176. Id. at 165. 
177. Id. at 170. 
178. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); see generally Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Limit of 
Zero Tolerance in Schools, 99 MINN. L. REV. 823, 832–34 (2015).  Black notes that in “the years 
leading up to the Court’s decision in Goss v. Lopez, the annual suspension rate for all racial 
groups, except African Americans, was below ten percent.  The total number of annual 
suspensions was about one and a half million.  Since then, the number of suspensions has 
doubled and the rate for each demographic group has increased significantly.”  Id. at 832.  
Further, he points out even the procedural due process requirements of Goss have been less than 
burdensome because schools “routinize process to produce the favored result.  Rather than a 
deliberative or collaborative process aimed at accuracy, justice, or educational lessons, due 
process is the routine through which a school must run.”  Id. at 846. 
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have increased since Goss and even Davis.179  The numbers of suspensions and 
expulsions have at least doubled since Goss was decided, and Davis did not stem 
that tide.180  Moreover, public schools have also increased the use of other strict 
security measures since Davis.181  More and more, schools have used measures such 
as “metal detectors, random sweeps, surveillance cameras, locked gates, and law 
enforcement officers” to aid and enforce school discipline.182 
Further, despite the Davis dissent’s predictions that any Title IX liability 
would usher in a flood of litigation, no such flood has come to pass.  Although 
sexual assault occurs at alarmingly high rates in public schools, complaints and 
lawsuits against schools based on them do not.183  Thousands of sexual assaults 
were reported in public schools from 2011 to 2015, but in 2016, the U.S. 
Department of Education Office of Civil Rights opened only 83 sexual harassment 
investigations in public elementary and secondary schools.184  The ratio of reported 
sexual assaults to complaints demonstrates that the Davis dissent’s predictions and 
 
179. See DANIEL J. LOSEN & RUSSELL J. SKIBA, SUSPENDED EDUCATION: URBAN MIDDLE SCHOOLS IN 
CRISIS 2 (2010), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/school-discipline/ 
suspended-education-urban-middle-schools-in-crisis/Suspended-Education_FINAL-2.pdf.  That the 
Court worried in Davis about the liability from disciplinary action when little such liability exists 
underscores the flaws in the notion that the imposition of Title IX liability would add to schools’ 
extant burdens.  See supra Subparts I.A–I.C. 
180. LOSEN & SKIBA, supra note 179, at 2; see also DANIEL LOSEN ET AL., CTR. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 
REMEDIES, UCLA, ARE WE CLOSING THE SCHOOL DISCIPLINE GAP? (2015), https:// 
escholarship.org/ uc/item/2t36g571.  The rise has occurred even though students’ commission 
of serious misbehavior in school has gone down slightly.  As Derek Black has noted, “schools 
suspend students for behavior that they have historically ignored or addressed through 
counseling and minor punishment.”  Black, supra note 178, at 835. 
  The increase in suspension and expulsion rates is higher when the rates are broken down by 
race and ethnicity.  In 1973, schools suspended 6 percent of Black middle school children.  
LOSEN & SKIBA, supra note 179, at 3.  In 2011–2012, that number had nearly quadrupled to 23.2 
percent.  LOSEN ET AL., supra, at 1; see also Black, supra note 178, at 835 (noting “[w]ith regard to 
the most serious misbehavior—violence—today’s students, according to the data, are slightly 
better behaved.”); Derek W. Black, Reforming School Discipline, 111 N.W. L. REV. 1 (2016) (“By 
short-term suspension or semester-and year-long expulsion, public schools exclude about three 
and a half million students a year.  Since the 1970s, many students’ chances of exclusion have 
doubled and tripled.”). 
181. Jason P. Nance, Students, Security, and Race, 63 EMORY L.J. 1, 13, 41 (2013) (demonstrating the 
rise in the use of strict security measures in school as the result, at least in part, of encouragement 
in federal statutory and case law and finding, among other things, that such measures are used 
more in schools with relatively large percentages of minority students). 
182. Id. at 13.  
183. McDowell et al., supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
184. Brown, supra note 10.  Those eighty-three complaints brought the total number of complaints from 
2009–2016 in K–12 public schools to 269.  Mark Keierleber, The Younger Victims of Sexual Violence in 
School, ATLANTIC (Aug. 10, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/ 2017/08/the-
younger-victims-of-sexual-violence-in-school/536418 [https://perma.cc/T2P7-EPYX]. 
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any lower courts’ consequent concerns about Title IX liability floods have not 
borne out. 
Finally, the notion that Title IX liability imposes significant practical burdens 
on schools, as the Davis dissent warned, does not survive critical analysis.  The 
Davis dissent cautioned against Title IX liability because it would force schools into 
the impractical position of having to teach behavioral norms to thousands of 
children.185  This concern fails on two counts.  First, it assumes that any one school 
must deal with thousands of children who do not conform to behavioral norms, 
which statistical data do not bear out.186  While thousands of children across the 
country may misbehave, individual schools generally do not face such high rates of 
misbehavior.187  Second, this alleged “burden” of teaching students behavioral 
norms is a basic responsibility of the public schools that has justified deference to 
their suppression of students’ constitutional rights.188 
The idea in Title IX cases that schools operate under the burden of 
regulations, therefore, is exaggerated.  But it does not mean that schools do not 
operate under burdens.  Schools shoulder many heavy burdens—regulatory and 
otherwise.189  Public schools must educate all students who walk through their 
 
185. Davis v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 666 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
186. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
187. A recent report assessing discipline data in school districts across the country consistently found 
“[f]ights or physical aggression among students . . . to be among the most common reasons for 
suspension.”  LOSEN & SKIBA, supra note 179, at 9.  In the 2009–2010 school year, for example, a 
total of 24,000 suspensions and expulsions occurred because of fights.  NAT’L CTR. EDUC. STATS., 
DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS tbl.233.10, https://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d14/ 
tables/dt14_233.10.asp [https://perma.cc/733Z-RXWU] (Number and percentage of public 
schools that took a serious disciplinary action in response to specific offenses, number of serious 
actions taken, and percentage distribution of actions, by type of offense, school level, and type 
of action: Selected years, 1999–2000 through 2009–10).  While that number is high, it is a 
nationwide statistic, suggesting that no one school is fending off thousands of fighting students. 
188. The Supreme Court has said that schools have a role in teaching students behavioral norms.  
Schools “must inculcate the habits and manners of civility” including teaching students to “take 
into account consideration of the sensibilities of others.”  Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 
681 (1986).  The Court further stated: 
Surely it is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit 
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.  Indeed, the 
“fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political 
system” disfavor the use of terms of debate highly offensive . . . to others.  The 
inculcation of these values is truly the “work of the schools.”  The determination 
of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate 
properly rests with the school board. 
 Id. at 683 (internal citations omitted); see also infra Subpart III.B. 
189. For example, some have decried the burdens on public schools related to the adoption of the 
Common Core Standards, which are a set of curricular standards that aim to make students 
“college and career ready,” among other things.  Valerie Strauss, The Coming Common Core 
Meltdown, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
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doors, and those students walk through those doors with many varied problems 
that present educational challenges.190  These burdens, however, are distinct from 
those envisioned by courts when limiting schools’ Title IX liability. 
D. The Unjustified School Civil Rights Vacuum 
Because the ideas supporting the limits on public school liability under these 
civil rights laws are flawed, so too are the liability limits themselves.  As justifications 
for the liability limits, they lack validity.  This suggests that public schools could and 
should be held to more stringent assessment of their liability under these laws.  That 
would not, as some might worry, turn the U.S. Constitution into a “font of tort 
law.”191  It would only hold schools liable for arbitrary exercises of authority that 
severely harm children.192  A real difference exists between making a constitutional 
claim out of any and all bumps and bruises, bad grades, or hurt feelings that occur 
in school, which would make the Constitution a font of tort law, and, for example, 
the arbitrary exercise of state authority under a Fourteenth Amendment claim for a 
violation of personal liberty and bodily integrity that results in egregious student 
harm.193  The critique here of the law’s treatment of such claims is not a call for 
 
sheet/wp/2014/01/23/the-coming-common-core-meltdown/?noredirect=on&utm_term=. 
6f1591a6ee32 [https://perma.cc/9GCP-Z2H3].  The critiques of the Common Core Standards 
include that their adoption in some states and school districts did not occur alongside a “credible 
plan to provide—or even to determine—the resources necessary to make every student ‘college 
and career ready’ as defined by the [standards].”  Id. 
  Others have separately noted the burdens schools face because of budget cuts and teacher 
shortages.  See infra note 207 and accompanying text.  While the burdens of Common Core 
implementation are debatable, budget cuts and teacher shortages are inarguably a burden on 
schools. 
190. Poverty, prevalent in public schools, causes numerous problems, including school readiness, 
social problems, and lack of parental capacity to protect children from or address these 
problems.  Patrice L. Engle & Maureen M. Black, The Effect of Poverty on Child Development 
and Educational Outcomes, 1136 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 243, 244–46 (2008). 
191. E.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 598 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neal ex rel. Neal 
v. Fulton Cty. Bd. of Educ., 229 F.3d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 2000)) (“Both this Court and the 
Supreme Court have ‘said repeatedly that the Fourteenth Amendment is not a ‘font of tort law’ 
that can be used, through [S]ection 1983, to convert state tort claims into federal causes of 
action.’”). 
192. Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Rights, Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 857, 
893 (1999) (pointing out that “the Court [in Paul v. Davis] may have feared the wholesale 
federalization of tort claims against state and local government officials and the corresponding 
prospect of massive damages liability” and would probably have come out differently if the 
plaintiff had only sought an injunction). 
193. See, e.g., Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 416 (6th Cir. 2016) (finding no conduct that rose to 
the “conscience-shocking level required of a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process 
claim” where teacher Marsha Kowalski’s extreme methods, which included tying students with 
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schools to be liable when a student gets his or her feelings hurt over receiving a 
detention for misbehavior.  It is a critique of the failure of the law to hold public 
schools accountable when a teacher uses state authority to throw that student 
against a wall, choke him, and then threaten him to not tell anyone.194  It is a critique 
focused on the problems of leaving students without legal recourse and protection 
when these serious harms occur in school. 
III. SERIOUS, TROUBLING CONSEQUENCES 
Schools’ limited liability under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX for 
harms to children in school not only lacks substantial justification, but it also has 
three significant consequences.  First, it affords schools vast deference to act 
without much, if any, regard for those harms.  Second, it shifts the burden to 
families to protect children from harms in school when schools exercise their 
discretion not to.195  Third, this burden shifting disproportionately impacts low-
income families, who now make up a majority of the public school population.196  
Their children, therefore, face compound vulnerabilities.  They operate under the 
vulnerabilities imposed generally by their lack of legal protections in school, which 
are compounded by their poverty. 
A. The Discretion to Do Very Little When Students Are Harmed  
in School 
The anemic reach of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX means that 
courts have afforded schools the discretion to ignore student harms or, when they 
cannot ignore them, do little or nothing in response.197  In the Fourteenth 
Amendment context, schools’ total lack of liability for failing to protect students 
means that they can ignore harms, since they will not be responsible for their failure 
to discover them.198  Similarly, the liability limits under Fourteenth Amendment 
bodily integrity claims allow, and even incentivize, schools to overlook student 
harms even though they theoretically could be held liable for them.  This is because 
they can avoid that liability with the assertion of even implausible pedagogical and 
 
disabilities to chairs, gurneys, and toilets for hours and gagging them, far exceeded the kinds of 
actions that result in mere bumps and mildly hurt feelings). 
194. See, e.g., Flores v. Sch. Bd., 116 F. App’x 504, 506 (5th Cir. 2004). 
195. See infra Subparts I.A–I.C. 
196. S. Educ. Found., A New Majority: Low Income Students Now a Majority in the Nation’s Public 
Schools 2 (2015). 
197. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
198. See supra Subpart I.A. 
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disciplinary goals.199  In the Title IX context, the courts’ assessment of the notice 
requirement, as Catharine MacKinnon has pointed out, incentivizes schools to 
look away from harms because it only holds schools liable for harms for which they 
have actual knowledge.200  If schools do not know of the harms, then they will not be 
held liable for them.201  So, ignoring suspected harms allows a school to evade 
liability for it.202 
Even when schools know about harms, these laws afford them the discretion 
to do very little, if anything, about it.  Because schools have no liability for failing to 
protect students under the Fourteenth Amendment even if they know about 
harms, they have no obligation to do anything about such harms.203  The deference 
afforded to schools’ pedagogical and disciplinary assertions in Fourteenth 
Amendment bodily integrity claims allows schools to do nothing in response to 
harms, if they so choose.204  They can defend their inaction by asserting even 
implausible pedagogical and disciplinary reasons for it and therefore their lack of 
response.205  Because Title IX only requires schools’ responses to sexual harassment 
be “not clearly unreasonable,” it too allows schools to do little in response to it.206  
Indeed, it arguably provides “an incentive for schools to go through the motions 
with an eye primarily to looking as if action is being taken, rather than to redressing 
the injury, stopping the abuse, or addressing the climate in the environment that 
produced and permitted it.”207 
Schools, therefore, can literally and figuratively throw up their hands and tell 
parents and students that they can do nothing about the harm.  Such responses are 
rational in the face of schools’ limited liability.  Schools, notoriously resource-poor, 
have to make choices about where to use those scarce resources.208  By giving 
 
199. See supra Subpart I.B. 
200. See MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 2069–72; and supra Subpart I.C. 
201. MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 2090–92. 
202. Id. at 2069–72, 2091 (discussing the interrelationship of the actual notice and deliberate 
indifference prongs of the Title IX standard and pointing out how they encourage “schools not 
to know and to avoid learning about sexual atrocities so as to avoid notice of them, so no 
response, however indifferent, can be deliberate”). 
203. See supra Subpart I.A. 
204. See supra Subpart I.B. 
205. See supra Subpart I.B. 
206. Davis, 526 U.S. at 649; see also MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 2091.   
207. Id. at 2092. 
208. See Derek W. Black, Averting Educational Crisis: Funding Cuts, Teacher Shortages, and the 
Dwindling Commitment to Public Education, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 423, 431–34 (2016) (“Over the 
past decade, public education has reached the point of crisis, much of which is the result of 
intentional state and federal action.  States enacted massive funding cuts to education budgets 
and services during the 2008 recession.  The funding cuts reached levels that would, based on 
social science research, have substantial negative effects on student achievement.”); see also 
MICHAEL LEACHMAN ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MOST STATES HAVE CUT 
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schools the discretion to not respond much, or at all, to student harms, the courts 
have allowed, even encouraged, them to choose to place those scant resources 
elsewhere. 
B. Shifting the Burden of Addressing Student Harms to Families 
By not constraining schools’ discretion and allowing, even arguably 
incentivizing, schools’ limited responses to student harms, the courts effectively 
shift the burden of addressing those harms to families.  By not requiring more of 
schools when children are harmed, the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX 
relieve schools of responsibility to protect children from and to address their harms 
in school.  That shifts the burden of doing so to families.  Because schools do not 
have to protect children from harm in school and address its effects, their families 
must.209  Placing the burden on families for protecting children and addressing 
their harms in school is a burden for any family because the family members are not 
present in school.210  Therefore, they cannot be available to protect students from or 
address immediate harms there.211 
 
SCHOOL FUNDING AND SOME CONTINUE CUTTING 1 (2016) (“At least 31 states provided less state 
funding per student in the 2014 school year (that is, the school year ending in 2014) than in the 
2008 school year, before the recession took hold.  In at least 15 states, the cuts exceeded 10 
percent.”); Nicole Amato, A Lack of Resources for Many Classrooms, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2015, 
6:51 AM), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/03/26/is-improving-schools-all-
about-money/a-lack-of-resources-for-many-classrooms (“Many teachers, especially in urban 
schools, are working with at-risk students with very few of the necessary resources to support 
them.”). 
209. Indeed, the courts expect parents to care for and protect their children even though they are at 
school.  E.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 173 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[S]tudents in public schools 
continue to be primarily dependent on their parents for their care and protection, not on 
their school.  Despite the students’ compulsory attendance in school during the school day 
and the school’s authority to act in loco parentis during that time, the school’s authority and 
responsibility neither supplants nor replaces the parent’s ultimate responsibility for the student 
absent more than is alleged here.”).  J.O. v. Alton Cmty. United Sch. Dist., 909 F.2d 267, 272 (7th 
Cir. 1990) (“[I]t cannot be suggested that compulsory school attendance makes a child unable to 
care for basic human needs.  The parents still retain primary responsibility for feeding, clothing, 
sheltering, and caring for the child.”). 
210. Some states, such as those with substantial influence over education policy, like California and 
Texas, do not allow parents to be present in school whenever they want, which of course limits 
their ability to be present in school and protect their children there.  In California, parents 
generally cannot visit schools without prior permission of and coordination with school 
officials.  CAL. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, CBSA Sample Board Policy—Visitors/Outsiders (BP 1250(a)) 
(201); General Inquiry—General Questions FAQ, TEX. EDUC. AGENCY, http://tea.texas.gov/ 
About_TEA/Contact_Us/General_Inquiry/General_Inquiry_-_General_Questions_ 
FAQ/#visit [https://perma.cc/P5ZH-AQ4S] (“Question 8.  What are my rights as a parent to 
visit a school during school hours?”). 
211. For example, Brittany Morrow’s parents could not be available to protect her when another 
student “attacked her” in the school lunchroom or when she separately tried to throw her down 
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Although it is arguably reasonable to place the responsibility on families for 
taking care of children while they are in school in certain contexts, it is not 
reasonable in the context of harms imposed on students in school.  For example, 
parents, not schools, have the responsibility for taking their children to the doctor 
when they are sick at school.  The families, though, can effectively act to care for 
their children in such instances because they can pick them up from school and 
take them to get the medical attention they need.212  In the case of 
contemporaneous harms happening to children in school, families lack the same 
capacity to care for their children by virtue of their absence from school.213  Their 
absence means they do not know about and can therefore do nothing about the 
harms.214  Even if a school were to alert a parent to harms that happen at school, the 
notice would be too late because the harm would already have occurred.  The only 
way for a parent to truly prevent and protect a child from harm at school would be 
to constantly be present with them at school, which is both impractical and often 
prohibited.215 
Moreover, this burden shifting, borne from the vast deference courts give 
schools, is not necessary.  First, the standards that offer schools this discretion are, 
 
a staircase in school.  Morrow, 719 F.3d at 164.  Lacking the ability to be with and protect the girls 
in school, the Morrows told the school that they would keep the girls home from school to 
protect them.  Doerschner, supra note 7.  In response, the school threatened the Morrows with a 
truancy action.  Id.  Similarly, because the parents of the students with disabilities who Marsha 
Kowalski tied for hours to toilets and gagged were not present in school at the time of the abuse, 
they could not know about the abuse in time to protect them from it and prevent it from 
happening.  Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 408 (6th Cir. 2016) (“Neither the students’ 
parents nor Kowalski’s supervisors were aware of the full extent of Brant’s concerns until after 
the end of the 2004 school year…Kowalski’s class met in a church where Kowalski went largely 
unobserved by other teachers or her direct supervisors, aside from a few weekly visits from 
behavioral and therapeutic specialists.  Further, due to the students’ limited verbal capacities, 
their parents relied on Kowalski’s daily classroom “journal” to keep them informed of the 
students’ progress.  Kowalski did not reference any of the above-described teaching techniques 
in her classroom journal, or otherwise share them with the students’ parents.”); see also supra 
notes 209–210 and accompanying text.   
212. Even in these instances, however, schools still have a role in caring for and protecting children.  
They often have to alert parents to the need to come get the children and address their illnesses.  
To that point, the Centers for Disease Control recommends that parents or other caregivers take 
children home from school if they develop flu-like symptoms.  Guidance for School 
Administrators to Help Reduce the Spread of Seasonal Influenza in K–12 Schools, CDC, 
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/school/guidance.htm [https://perma.cc/BB3J-3DTJ]. 
213. Parental absence from school is expected, school-imposed, structural, and top-down.  Nancy E. 
Hill & Kathryn Torres, Negotiating the American Dream: The Paradox of Aspirations and 
Achievement Among Latino Students and Engagement Between Their Families and Schools, 66 J. 
SOC. ISSUES 95, 98 (2010) (“[M]ost principals are trained to manage their schools without regard 
for parental involvement.”). 
214. See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
215. See supra note 210 and accompanying test. 
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as previously discussed, based on misconceptions.  Second, neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor Title IX precludes the imposition of more constraints on schools’ 
discretion for responding to students’ harms by requiring schools do more to 
protect students.  To the contrary, the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX could 
limit schools’ discretion for responding to students’ harms.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment holds this promise in part because it arguably was ratified “to 
incorporate the right of protection into the Federal Constitution, and 
thereby . . . compel the states to fulfill their duty of protection.”216  As Robin West 
has contended, the Fourteenth Amendment:  
[E]nsures that all citizens equally enjoy the basic terms of the social 
contract, that the state protects all from private assault, that the state 
protects all from their own vulnerability, that the state recognizes the 
equality of all citizens under law, and that the state assures that they live 
under no separate sovereign authority.  Only with such protection may 
persons construct the public, productive, responsible, autonomous lives 
that the liberal state and its rule of law ideal envisions.217 
Similarly, Title IX’s very purpose is to protect students from sexual harassment and 
all other forms of sexual discrimination in the public schools.218 Nowhere is this 
promise and purpose more in need of fulfillment than in the public school context, 
where children need protections from harm to benefit from the education being 
provided there.219   
The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX, therefore, could require schools to 
implement processes for discovering, or obtaining notice, of students’ harms.  They 
could also shape schools’ substantive responses to those harms by requiring schools 
to meet particular standards when responding to them.  In short, they could help 
meaningfully shape school responses to student harms, but they do not. 
 
216. Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 507, 571 (1991). 
217. Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 
FLA. L. REV. 45, 70 (1990) (footnote omitted). 
218.   See Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979) (“Title IX, like its model Title 
VI, sought to accomplish two related, but nevertheless somewhat different, objectives. 
First, Congress wanted to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory 
practices; second, it wanted to provide individual citizens effective protection against 
those practices. Both of these purposes were repeatedly identified in the debates on the 
two statutes.”). 
219. When children are harmed in school, they face educational losses that are sometimes total.  See 
infra notes 230–231 and accompanying text. 
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C. Particularly Burdening Families With Low Incomes and Low Social Capital 
Not only is this public school deference and the consequent burden shift to 
families unnecessary, it operates as a particular burden for low-income families 
and families with low social capital.220  They lack the very resources they need to 
protect students from and address their harms.221  Further, because low-income 
families, who often also have low social capital,222 now make up a majority of the 
public school population, this particular burden affects the majority of public 
school students.223 
To the extent families can do anything to protect children while they are in 
school, they need social and financial capital for the task.  Social capital is “the 
material and immaterial resources that individuals and families are able to access 
through their social ties.”224  It includes the sense of agency and the capacity to 
interact with school professionals.225  Families need social capital to protect children 
in school because one way of doing that is by intervening in school to try to get the 
schools to act.226  Families also need financial capital to protect children from harms 
 
220. See infra notes 224–226, 232–233 and accompanying text. 
221. See infra notes 224–226, 232–233 and accompanying text. 
222. Erin McNamara Horvat et al., From Social Ties to Social Capital: Class Differences in the 
Relations Between Schools and Parent Networks, 40 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 319, 331 (2003).  Social 
capital also includes the ability to access information about school, which can be complex and 
hard to access.  Families with low social capital have a harder time getting and using information 
about schools.  Valerie E. Lee, Educational Choice: The Stratifying Effects of Selecting Schools and 
Courses, 7 EDUC. POL’Y 125, 141–42 (1993). 
223. According to a report by the Southern Education Foundation, which analyzed public data from 
the National Center for Education Statistics, 51 percent of students in public schools came 
from low-income families in 2013.  S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 195, at 2.  In forty states, low-
income students comprised 40 percent or more of the public school population, and in twenty-
one of those states, the majority of the students were low-income.  Id.  To count as “low-income” 
for the purposes of this data set, families’ income made students eligible for free or reduced 
lunch at school.  Id.  That means these families are extremely poor.  Students are eligible for 
free lunch if their family income is no more than 135 percent of the federal poverty line 
and reduced lunch if their family income is no more than 185 percent of the federal poverty 
line.  Id.  In 2013, at the time the data was compiled in 2013, a child in a two-person family of one 
adult and one child qualified for free lunch if the family had “an annual income of less than 
$19,669” and reduced lunch if the family had an income of $27,991 or less.  Id. 
224. Horvat et al., supra note 222, at 323. 
225. Carol Vincent & Jane Martin, Class, Culture and Agency: Researching Parental Voice, 23 
DISCOURSE 109, 113 (2002).  In a study on parental “voice,” the authors found that wealthier 
parents have more social capital and consequently are more likely to exercise their voice by 
intervening in school on their children’s behalf.  Id. at 125. 
226. See, e.g., Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (when another student repeatedly 
physically and verbally harassed high school students Emily and Brittany Morrow, their parents 
met with school officials to try to get them to act to address the problem, albeit to no avail); see 
also Doerschner, supra note 7 (describing the efforts Mr. and Mrs. Morrow made to prod their 
daughters’ school to act to protect them from harassment, including presenting the school with 
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in school because they would otherwise not be able to remove students from school 
and enroll them in private school when their public school–based interventions 
fail.227  Some families even relocate in order to enroll their children in another 
school district, which also of course comes at a financial cost.228 
Families also need financial capital to address the consequences of the harms 
that children suffer when schools do not and families cannot protect them.  
Children suffer educational losses and emotional and psychological harms as a 
result of abuse and harassment in school.229  Students suffer depression, 
contemplate suicide, and develop psychological disorders, notably PTSD, as the 
result of abuse in school.230  In response, families seek therapy, medication, and 
 
a court imposed no-contact order prohibiting the harassing student from contacting the 
Morrow girls). 
227. Lee, supra note 222, at 141–42.  According to the most recent data available from the National 
Center for Education Statistics, in 2011–2012 the average cost of private school tuition was 
$10,740.  NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, PRIVATE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY 
ENROLLMENT, NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, AND AVERAGE TUITION, BY SCHOOL LEVEL, ORIENTATION, 
AND TUITION: SELECTED YEARS, 1999–2000 THROUGH 2011–2012 (2013), https://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/digest/d13/tables/dt13_205.50.asp [https://perma.cc/BK34-5ZCH].  That the 
majority of children in public schools come from low-income families means that their families’ 
incomes are less than 185 percent of the federal poverty level.  S. EDUC. FOUND., supra note 196.  
In 2012, a family of four met that threshold if they made less than $42,624.50 per year.  77 Fed. 
Reg. 4034 (Jan. 26, 2012).  That family of four, therefore, would have to spend 
approximately one quarter of their total annual family income to pay the average annual 
tuition for just one child to go to private school. 
228. In T.K. v. New York City Department of Education, the parents of a child with a disability who 
was bullied could not to get the principal to address the problem.  779 F. Supp. 2d 289 (E.D.N.Y. 
2011).  So, they enrolled her in a private school and then moved to another school district.  Id. at 
295.  In Bridges v. Scranton School District, the parents of another child who was bullied 
withdrew their child from school and enrolled him in a cyber school, which children attend 
from home.  644 F. App’x 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2016). 
229. E.g., T.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Sch. Bd., 610 F.3d 588, 596 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that due to the 
verbal abuse and inappropriate physical restraints inflicted on him by his teachers, T.W. 
dropped out of school, which was a decision that a psychologist who evaluated T.W. said could 
“‘be directly traced back to his experiences with [his teacher] Ms. Garrett’”); Costello v. Mitchell 
Pub. Sch. Dist. 79, 266 F.3d 916, 920 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting a psychiatrist who evaluated 
plaintiff Sadonya Costello, a student who was repeatedly verbally abused as well as physically 
assaulted by a teacher, concluding that “if Sadonya ‘returns to school at this point her situation 
would only worsen, both physically and mentally.’”). 
230. E.g., Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 965 (11th Cir. 2015) (noting the student who was raped as a 
result of the school-planned, rape-bait scheme experienced an exacerbation of her depression); 
T.W., 610 F.3d at 601 (noting that because of his abuse in school T.W. experienced an 
exacerbation of his extant developmental disabilities and developed PTSD); Costello, 266 F.3d at 
920 (noting that Sadonya Costello experienced depression and suicidal ideation related to her 
abuse in school). 
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sometimes residential mental health treatment for their children, all of which 
require financial resources.231 
Families with low incomes and low social capital often simply do not have the 
ability to meet these costs.232  The burden, then, of protecting children and addressing 
their harms in school is particularly acute for them.  The families of the majority of the 
public school population, therefore, are expected to protect their children from and 
address harms in school but lack the resources to do so.233 
Consequently, a majority of the public school population is not only left 
largely without recourse in the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX for harms 
 
231. E.g., Hill, 797 F.3d at 965 (the student, who was raped in school, underwent mental health 
counseling and took medication for her depression); J.P.M. v. Palm Beach Cty. Sch. Bd., 916 F. 
Supp. 2d 1314, 1315–16 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (parents enrolled their son, who had a disability and was 
restrained in school, in residential treatment to “overcome the trauma” of the restraints); 
Costello, 266 F.3d at 920 (Sadonya Costello received psychiatric treatment and counseling to deal 
with it). 
232. Low-income families already experience much higher rates of homelessness, food insecurity, 
and lack of insurance, among other things.  According to the Children’s Defense Fund, in 2011–
2012, “nearly 1.2 million public school students were homeless.”  Marian Wright Edelman, 
Forward to Children’s Def. Fund, The State of America’s Children 4 (2017).  To put a finer point on 
it, the Children’s Defense Fund report states that “[o]n a single night in January 2013, 138,149 
children were homeless in shelters, transitional housing, or on the streets . . . .”  CHILDREN’S DEF. 
FUND, THE STATE OF AMERICA’S CHILDREN 26 (2014).  In 2012, more than one in nine children 
were in households that were food insecure.  Id. at 4.  Additionally, despite increased insurance 
enrollment rates, in 2012, nearly 7.2 million children were uninsured.  Id. at 6.  These problems 
make it more difficult for low-income families to seek out the therapies and other services 
needed to address the effects of harms in schools.  Struggling to meet basic needs, they will be 
hard-pressed to protect their children from or address their harms in school.  Significantly, there 
is also a strong racial and ethnic component to these statistics and these problems.  Over 11 
million, or almost one in three, children of color were low-income in 2012.  Id. at 4.  “Black 
children were the poorest (39.6 percent) followed by American Indian/Native Alaskan children 
(36.8 percent) and Hispanic children (33.7 percent).”  Id.  These problems of poverty and the 
difficulties they create for families in protecting them and addressing their harms in school, 
therefore, disproportionately affect children of color. 
233. Studies have found that families with low social capital are less likely to intervene in their child’s 
education and school experience.  Horvat et al., supra note 222, at 331.  Significantly, a study has 
found this reticence to specifically affect families’ inclinations to intervene when teachers 
behaved inappropriately.  Id. at 334 (“Our observations confirm that, on occasion, school 
officials or teachers would manhandle a student, by shoving or vigorously shaking him or her, or 
twisting an arm.  Thus events that created an explosion of collective outrage among middle-class 
families tended to generate isolated anger or resigned acceptance within working-class and 
poor families.”).  Latino families in particular face obstacles to engaging in public schools.  They 
often feel “unwelcome and misunderstood.”  Nancy E. Hill & Kathryn Torres, Negotiating the 
American Dream: The Paradox of Aspirations and Achievement Among Latino Students and 
Engagement Between Their Families and Schools, 66 J. SOC. ISSUES 95, 98 (2010).  “Even when 
Latino parents engage in activities designed to increase parental involvement (e.g., PTA, 
volunteering), they often come away feeling confused by the school structure and implicit 
expectations. . . .  They often find that their attempts to garner information are thwarted, and 
they feel abandoned.”  Id. at 99. 
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suffered in school, but their families also lack the resources to fill the gaps.  By failing 
in their potential to put bounds around schools’ decisions, therefore, these civil 
rights laws leave students unprotected and vulnerable in school.  They allow 
schools to respond almost however they want to student harms, which means 
sometimes they respond ineffectively, counterproductively, or not at all.234  When 
the law requires so little of schools when children are harmed, their families must 
step in to bear the burden of protecting them in school.  Because the majority of 
public school children come from low-income families, bearing the burden of this 
work is nearly impossible.  They have fewer avenues for recourse than children 
whose families have the resources to do what the law says schools need not.  The 
inadequacies of the law and their families’ income status leave these children 
unprotected and vulnerable in school. 
IV. STRENGTHENING THE LAW TO REDUCE STUDENTS’ VULNERABILITY 
Because the courts’ evaluations of students’ Fourteenth Amendment and 
Title IX claims are rooted in misconceptions, those misconceptions should be 
abandoned.  Doing so would justify changing the courts’ evaluations of these claims 
so that schools are held to an effectively higher legal standard and receive less 
deference in their decisionmaking when students are harmed.  Such changes would 
bolster students’ legal protections in school and reduce their vulnerability.  Further, 
such changes offer the promise of broader systemic reforms.  The imposition of 
liability on the public schools for the serious harms to individual students discussed 
here can spur broader systemic change as a result of the deterrent and fault-fixing 
effects of liability, which would help even those students who suffer less severe 
harms.235 
These proposed changes, however, are not without possible critiques.  One 
such serious critique is that increasing schools’ liability creates inefficiencies and 
breeds a moral hazard.  I will respond to that and other critiques in Subpart IV.E 
below. 
 
234. See supra Part I. 
235. Significantly, these proposed changes to the evaluation of students’ claims are relatively modest 
in at least one sense.  They would better protect students who suffer severe harm.  See infra 
Subparts IV.B–IV.D.  That alone would be a vast improvement over the state of the law 
currently because even those students have little recourse in the law.  See supra Subparts I.A–I.C.  
That said, they also offer the potential for spurring more systemic reforms as well. 
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A. School Liability as a Deterrent to and a “Fault Fixer” for Ignoring Harms 
or Meaninglessly Responding to Them 
As an initial matter, it is worth addressing how increasing the potential for 
public schools’ liability in the ways proposed here will deter schools from ignoring 
harms to children or responding meaninglessly to them on a systemic level.  First, 
scholars generally agree that government liability has a deterrent effect.236  As the 
Supreme Court has said about Section 1983, which provides a mechanism for 
asserting claims for constitutional violations, it “presupposes that damages that 
compensate for actual harm ordinarily suffice to deter constitutional violations.”237  
The deterrent effect results from not wanting to be sued.238  Individual government 
employees and the government entities want to avoid lawsuits for a variety of 
reasons, including financial.239  Lawsuits also cause embarrassment for individuals 
and government bodies, which also serves as a deterrent.240  In addition, lawsuits 
have “immense political costs (in the sense of everyday workplace politics) 
associated with a finding of liability and exposing [it] to budgetary pay-outs.”241 
Relatedly, liability also has, as Myriam Gilles terms it, a “fault-fixing” effect.242  
Gilles describes this effect in the municipal liability context as “localizing culpability 
 
236. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Civil Rights Without Remedies: Vicarious Liability Under 
Title VII, Section 1983, and Title IX, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 755, 796 (1999) (“Moreover, 
allowing local governments to be held vicariously liable for the acts of their employees would 
advance the compensation and deterrence goals of Section 1983.”); Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense 
of Making Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 
845, 854 (2001) (“The question of whether constitutional tort remedies serve any deterrent effect 
is, I think, easily answered in the affirmative.”); John Rappaport, How Private Insurers Regulate 
Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1547 (2017) (“[I]nsurers transform vague, uncertain 
liability exposure into finely grained policies backed by differentiated premiums and the threat 
of coverage denial.  That is a substantial part of how civil liability deters misconduct in insured 
jurisdictions.”); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, Budgets, and Police 
Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1151 (2016) (noting there is general agreement among scholars 
that liability has a deterrent effect).  But see Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, 
Politics and the Allocation of Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 346 (2000) 
(questioning liability’s deterrent effect in the realm of eminent domain authority of the state). 
237. Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 (1986) (regarding an action to 
vindicate a teacher’s First Amendment rights after the teacher was suspended for using a 
textbook that included a chapter on human reproduction). 
238. See infra notes 239, 241, 245 and accompanying text. 
239. Schwartz, supra note 236, at 1151; Gilles, supra note 236, at 854 (“No police officer wants to be 
sued, particularly where there is no absolute guarantee that his municipal employer will pay for 
his defense and indemnify him for damages.”). 
240. Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1681 (2003). 
241. Gilles, supra note 236, at 854–55.  As Margo Schlanger has noted, “media coverage of abuses or 
administrative failures can trigger embarrassing political inquiry and even firings, resignations, 
or election losses.”  Schlanger, supra note 240, at 1681. 
242. Gilles, supra note 236, at 861. 
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in the municipality itself and forcing municipal policymakers to consider 
reformative measures.”243  A judgment against a government entity offers 
claimants “symbolic vindication from the municipality as well as the individual 
official for violations of constitutional rights.  This symbolic vindication is at the 
very core of the fault-fixing function of municipal liability claims, and, together 
with the information function of such claims, can reasonably be expected to have a 
deterrent effect on municipal policymakers.”244  It offers an “incentive to monitor, 
supervise, and control the acts of their employees.”245 
School districts, as arms of the state, are susceptible to all of these pressures.246  
They face budgetary constraints and are subjected to media scrutiny when they are 
sued.247  So, increasing their potential liability for meaningless, ineffectual responses 
to student harms would deter those responses.  Although Gilles’s discussion of the 
fault-fixing function of liability focused on municipality liability, that effect is no 
different on schools.248  They too can be encouraged to reform by way of liability 
and to better monitor students, their harm, and patterns and practices that led to 
such harm.249 
 
243. Id. at 861. 
244. Id. at 865 (Gilles quotes Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, where the Third Circuit noted that 
liability “‘not only holds that entity responsible for its actions and inactions, but also can 
encourage [it] to reform the patterns and practices that led to constitutional violations, as well as 
alert the municipality and its citizenry to the issue’” to support this point.). 
245. Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 236, at 796 (arguing in favor of vicarious liability for 
municipalities under Section 1983, the authors note “[l]ocal governments, with inherently 
scarce resources, obviously want to minimize the amount of their budget that is lost to paying 
damages”). 
246. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943) (calling boards of education 
“creatures” of the state); see also Comm. for Educ. Equal. v. State, 878 S.W.2d 446, 457 (Mo. 
1994) (Robertson, J., concurring in result) (“School districts are creatures of state law established 
to carry out governmental functions. . . . ”). 
247. See, e.g., McDowell et al., supra note 15; Caplan-Bricker, supra note 10; Brown, supra note 10. 
248. Significantly, the Supreme Court has noted the deterrent effect of Section 1983 liability in the 
context of lawsuits against schools.  Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 310 
(1986) (“Section 1983 presupposes that damages that compensate for actual harm ordinarily 
suffice to deter constitutional violations.”). 
249. One issue worth considering in an assessment of the deterrent effects of liability is the role of 
insurance.  John Rappaport persuasively argues in his significant piece on the regulatory 
capacity of private insurance over police that the insurer “develops a financial incentive 
to reduce that risk through loss prevention.”  Rappaport, supra note 236, at 1543.  Rappaport 
demonstrates how these loss prevention efforts, among other things, can play a significant role in 
affecting police behavior.  Id. at 1573–74.  Although there is substantial room for scholarly 
research on the degree to which insurers can play a similar role in the public school context, that 
inquiry is beyond the scope of this Article. 
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B. Changing the Evaluation of Fourteenth Amendment  
Duty to Protect Claims 
With respect to Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect claims, schools 
currently feel no such pressure from the threat of liability because courts have 
consistently found they have no duty to protect students.250  Although schools 
have some measure of physical custody over students as the result of mandatory 
attendance laws, courts find that the public schools have no duty to protect students 
because they tie the custodial relationship giving rise to a duty to protect 
students to physical custody that necessitates caretaking.251  Abandoning the 
misconception that parents can exclusively do the caretaking of their children 
even when they are at school, therefore, justifies the development of a new 
classification of custody as between students and schools.  That in turn justifies both 
the conclusion that schools have a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect 
students and a burden-shifting framework for evaluating it. 
Acknowledging that parents cannot do all the caretaking of children in school 
and that schools also do caretaking, as courts have acknowledged in other contexts, 
justifies finding that schools have a custodial relationship with students.252  They 
have a custodial relationship because they have physical control of students by way 
of mandatory attendance laws that require students’ physical presence in school, 
and they must and do take care of them while they are there.  Schools, therefore, 
have a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment to protect students. 
This duty, however, is necessarily limited by the nature of the custodial 
relationship between schools and students.  It falls between the custodial relationships 
in the Estelle-Youngberg and the DeShaney scenarios.253  Although schools do not 
have full-time control over students in the same way the state does over prisoners 
and institutionalized persons as in Estelle and Youngberg, they have more control 
over students and their wellbeing than when they are physically with their parents, 
as was the case in DeShaney.254  A school’s duty to protect students is, therefore, 
 
250. See supra Subpart I.A. 
251. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
252. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text. 
253. D.R. ex rel. L.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Technical Sch., 972 F.2d 1364, 1383 (3d Cir. 
1992) (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (“There is no doubt that this case falls between DeShaney and 
Estelle/Youngberg.”). 
254. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text.  In rejecting these claims, the federal courts of 
appeals acknowledge the compulsory nature of school attendance but argue that it is nothing 
like imprisonment or institutionalization because schools do not have full-time custody, and 
parents still retain caretaking responsibility over their children.  See, e.g., Doe v. Hillsboro Indep. 
Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 1412, 1415 (5th Cir. 1997) (“The restrictions imposed by attendance laws 
upon students and their parents are not analogous to the restraints of prisons and mental 
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limited and specific, as compared to parents’ general duty to protect their children.  
It is limited because the schools’ custody and caretaking of students is limited to the 
time they are in school.  So, schools only have a duty to protect students when they 
are in school.  Although limited and specific, this duty on the part of schools to 
protect students would nonetheless serve to reduce students’ vulnerability while 
they are in school.255 
One could argue, however, that custody is binary—all or nothing.  So, if 
parents have physical custody, schools cannot.  Yet, custody is not binary even with 
respect to parents.  Parents regularly split custody between themselves and with 
others.256  So, if custody is divisible among parents and nonparents, schools too can, 
and in actuality do, have some physical custody of children.  Moreover, courts have 
evaluated physical custody under the auspices of the Fourteenth Amendment in a 
particular way, distinct from the assessments under state family law.  Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect analysis, the state takes custody of an 
individual when it restrains the person’s liberty such that the individual cannot 
take care of basic needs.257  When the state requires students to be in school, it takes 
 
institutions.  The custody is intermittent and the student returns home each day.”); Sargi v. Kent 
City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 911 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[C]ompulsory school attendance does not 
restrict a student’s liberty such that neither the child nor his parents are unable to attend to the 
child’s basic human needs.”); Dorothy J. v. Little Rock Sch. Dist., 7 F.3d 729, 732 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(“Public school attendance does not render a child’s guardians unable to care for the child’s basic 
needs.  In this regard, public schools are simply not analogous to prisons and mental 
institutions.”); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1371 (“The state’s duty to prisoners and involuntarily 
committed patients exits because of the fulltime severe and continuous restriction of liberty in 
both [prisons and mental health facilities].”); J.O. v. Alton Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 11, 909 F.2d 
267, 272 (7th Cir. 1990) (“By mandating school attendance . . . the state of Illinois has not 
assumed responsibility for [students’] entire personal lives.”).  Notably, the dissents in some 
cases do note that mandatory attendance laws fall somewhere between the full-time state 
custody of imprisoned and institutionalized persons and the total lack of state custody of 
children who are physically with their parents.  See Morrow v. Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 188–89 (3d 
Cir. 2013) (Fuentes, J., dissenting) (critiquing the majority decision by pointing out that “Middle 
Bucks provides no basis to conclude that DeShaney endorses an all-or-nothing approach that 
turns on the existence of ‘round-the-clock’ physical custody or on who remained the primary 
caregiver.”); Middle Bucks, 972 F.2d at 1379 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting) (“DeShaney contains no 
language to support the majority’s holding that the duty to protect can be triggered only by 
involuntary, round-the-clock, legal custody.”). 
255. In a previous project, I made alternative, though related, arguments supporting the recognition 
of a Fourteenth Amendment duty of schools to protect students.  Suski, The Privacy of the Public 
Schools, supra note 29.  I do not abandon those arguments here.  Indeed, this argument for a 
more nuanced understanding of custody that acknowledges that schools, and not just the 
family, take care of children complements those earlier arguments. 
256. Standby guardianship laws serve as just one example.  They allow for parents to retain legal and 
physical custody while another person serves as a temporary guardian caring for a child’s legal 
and physical needs.  E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 29-2-11 (2019). 
257. See supra Subpart I.A.  The form of custody the courts discuss is akin to state custody under the 
Fourth and Eighth Amendments, which is defined as being “subject to a number of restrictive 
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physical custody of them such that the students cannot take care of their basic 
needs.  Students cannot independently take care of basic needs, including their own 
safety, while in school.258  Their parents, by virtue of their absence from the school, 
also cannot take care of these basic needs.  Schools, therefore, have to take care of 
them.259  As such, they have custody as the courts have defined it under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.260 
Recognizing a Fourteenth Amendment duty of schools to protect students 
would of course increase the potential for public school liability.  For example, the 
inactions of a school in a case like Morrow v. Balaski, in which the school knew of 
the “torment” that Emily and Brittany Morrow endured and abdicated a role in 
responding to it, would likely violate the Fourteenth Amendment.261  Cases where 
the schools know about the harm and do nothing offer the clearest example of 
when Fourteenth Amendment liability would incur. 
In such cases, the recognition of a Fourteenth Amendment duty on the part 
of schools would put bounds around their discretion regarding whether to 
protect students.  Elsewhere I have advocated for a Fourteenth Amendment duty 
to protect based on an alternative but complementary theory to the one advanced 
here and proposed a framework for evaluating the claims.262  That framework 
applies equally well here with the addition of a burden-shifting provision.  In short, 
that framework calls for schools to respond reasonably, meaning in ways aimed at 
remedying and preventing the harms, to protect students from harms that they 
 
conditions governing various aspects of his life” for federal habeas corpus purposes and “‘formal 
arrest or restraint on freedom of movement’” for Miranda purposes.  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 
U.S. 420, 430 (1984) (quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (per curiam)). 
258. See supra Subpart II.A. 
259. In addition, as noted previously, the courts and statutes have recognized and imposed, 
respectively, these caretaking responsibilities.  See supra notes 121, 123–124 and accompanying 
text. 
260. Another critique is that as much as schools may do some caretaking, that does not change the 
legal custodial relationship between parents and children or shift it temporarily to schools.  In 
my earlier article, I address this critique.  In brief, the response to this critique is that custody of 
parents is qualitatively changed by their lack of control over their children in school, and those 
changes create an obligation on the part of schools to fill the gap.  Suski, The Privacy of the Public 
Schools, supra note 29.  That said, the response made here about conceptualization of custody 
under the Fourteenth Amendment also helps answer this critique. 
261. 719 F.3d 160, 164 (3d Cir. 2013). 
262. See Suski, The Privacy of the Public Schools, supra note 29.  In this framework, the circumstances 
under which a school would be held liable for harms to children was limited to situations in 
which it reasonably should have known of them or actually knew about them.  Id. at 482–83.  
Although I only advance a more limited version of such a constructive notice standard in the 
Title IX context, the reasoning for the more limited standard there—that the actual notice 
standard was justified by more than just misconceptions about public schools and families—do 
not apply in this context.  See infra Subpart IV.D. and accompanying text. 
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knew or should have known of.263  The re-envisioning of the student-school 
custodial relationship advanced here justifies the addition of a burden-shifting 
component to this framework.  Because the school’s custodial relationship with 
students is special, a presumption that the school breached its duty to protect students 
should arise once a student plaintiff offers some affirmative evidence that the school 
knew or should have known of the student’s harm and did little or nothing to 
remedy it.  The burden would then be on the school to rebut that presumption with 
a showing that they had acted reasonably to protect the student. 
If adopted, such a framework could require schools to implement processes 
for ensuring they meet its notice requirements.  Requiring schools to respond 
reasonably to students’ harms would compel them to develop meaningful 
substantive responses by schools to student harms.264  In addition, the recognition 
of a Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect students would increase the potential 
for deterrent and fault-fixing effects.265  Because these claims are not recognized 
now, they have no hope of promoting such effects.  Recognizing the claims, 
therefore, can only increase the potential for promoting systemwide school 
reforms. 
C. Changing the Evaluation of Fourteenth Amendment Personal  
Liberty and Bodily Integrity Claims 
As in the Fourteenth Amendment duty to protect context, abandoning the 
exaggerated justifications for public schools’ limited liability in Fourteenth 
Amendment personal liberty and bodily integrity claims justifies changing the 
evaluation of those claims such that schools’ liability is increased.  Currently, courts 
show extreme reticence or outright refusal to inquire at all into schools’ pedagogical 
and disciplinary goals and methods out of exaggerated notions about schools’ 
special expertise and courts’ concomitant lack thereof.266  They do not even 
examine them for objective plausibility.267  Because, however, courts need no 
particular expertise to scrutinize a nonexistent or implausible pedagogical or 
disciplinary goal or method, they can and should examine those goals and 
methods.268  Requiring courts to inquire into the objective plausibility of schools’ 
 
263. See Suski, The Privacy of the Public Schools, supra note 29, at 482–83. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. 
266. See supra Subpart II.B. 
267. See supra Subpart I.B. 
268. In a previous article, I also called for a change to the standard for evaluating these claims so that 
courts can better evaluate whether schools’ actions—including verbal assaults—that cause 
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pedagogical and disciplinary goals and methods would reduce their deference to 
such assertions and limit school discretion to respond however they want, or not at 
all, to student harms.  The determination of objective plausibility also provides a 
limiting principle for judicial inquiries.  It allows for courts to defer to school 
expertise when established by plausible evidence, but preserves the protection of 
the law when evidence cannot establish even the plausibility of the asserted 
pedagogical and disciplinary methods. 
Courts’ evaluation of students’ Fourteenth Amendment personal liberty and 
bodily integrity claims, therefore, can and should lift the veil over schools’ 
pedagogical and disciplinary defenses.  They should not simply defer to and accept 
as valid any asserted pedagogical or disciplinary goal.  When assessing the need for 
force used by the school, they should instead inquire into the objective plausibility 
of the asserted pedagogical and disciplinary needs.269  When assessing the 
proportionality between the amount of force and its need, they should again 
inquire into whether the amount of force could, from an objective standpoint, 
plausibly have been required to meet the need.270  Such an inquiry would still allow 
the schools discretion because it still gives schools a wide berth for discipline—it 
need only be objectively plausible.271  Placing the parameter of objective plausibility 
around that berth, though, would nonetheless increase schools’ potential liability 
and therefore have the deterrent and fault-fixing effects discussed above.272  It 
would reduce the deference courts currently afford schools to ignore or not 
respond to student harm.  Instead, public schools would have to respond when 
such harm occurs without objectively plausible pedagogical or disciplinary cause. 
One critique of these proposed changes, however, is that it would result 
in error costs to judges and the courts.273  Scholars have raised concerns about the 
error costs associated with requiring courts to evaluate matters that require 
expertise.274  Those matters call for courts to develop specialized knowledge, which 
 
emotional harm, which can be more severe and longer-lasting than physical harm, violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Suski, supra note 68. 
269. See supra Subpart I.B. 
270. See supra Subpart I.B. 
271. This proposed change to the Fourteenth Amendment standard is not unlike the ineffective 
assistance of counsel standard in that it offers room for deference and discretion to the public 
schools even though it also ratchets up the scrutiny of schools’ actions.  Overcoming a challenge 
to a conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel only requires a showing of deficient 
performance that prejudiced the defense.  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).  
The Supreme Court admonished that under this standard, “scrutiny of counsel’s performance 
must be highly deferential.”  Id. at 689.  Yet, it still requires that counsel’s performance be 
objectively reasonable to overcome a claim that it was deficient.  Id. at 688–90. 
272. See supra Subpart IV.A. 
273. Moss, supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
274. Id. 
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increases the risk that courts will make errors in judgment.275  Because inquiring 
into implausible or nonexistent pedagogical and disciplinary goals requires no such 
specialized knowledge, however, changing the evaluation of Fourteenth 
Amendment claims in the ways proposed here does not increase the risk of such 
error costs.276 
Requiring courts to scrutinize the plausibility of pedagogical or disciplinary 
goals would change the outcomes in some of the most tragic of cases in which 
students suffered substantial harm and could prompt school reforms on a 
systemwide level aimed at protecting students.  Take, for example, Domingo v. 
Kowalski, where students with disabilities were strapped, sometimes for hours, to 
toilets, chairs, and a gurney.277  The outcome of the students’ claims likely would 
have been different had the court had to inquire into the plausibility of the asserted 
pedagogical and disciplinary goals and methods.278  While toilet training itself is a 
proper pedagogical goal, the notion that the teacher strapped a student to a 
toilet for hours at a time for that purpose is implausible.279  Lacking a plausible goal 
for an hours-long restraint of a child also makes it an excessive method or use of 
force.  Assessing the plausibility of the need for the restraint in Domingo, therefore, 
would have called into question two prongs of the Fourteenth Amendment bodily 
integrity standard—the need for force and the excessiveness of the force—and 
would have made a finding of a Fourteenth Amendment violation more likely, if not 
inevitable.  That, in turn, would increase the likelihood of such liability having both 
deterrent and fault-fixing effects on the school.  It would set a standard for when such 
schools would have to intervene—and develop processes for doing so—when harms 
to children result from actions that have no real pedagogical or disciplinary purpose. 
D. Changing the Evaluation of Title IX Claims 
Finally, abandoning the flawed justifications for public schools’ limited 
liability under Title IX would support a change to the evaluation of those claims as 
well.  Title IX’s liability limits for peer sexual harassment, embodied in the 
assessment of its actual notice and deliberate indifference standard, arose in part 
out of concerns about both the need for substantial deference to schools’ 
pedagogical and disciplinary decisions, as well as the potential burdens that Title IX 
 
275. Id. 
276. See supra Subpart II.B. 
277. Domingo v. Kowalski, 810 F.3d 403, 407 (6th Cir. 2016). 
278. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
279. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text. 
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liability would impose on schools.280  Recognizing the flaws in these ideas justifies 
changing the evaluation of the Davis actual notice and deliberate indifference 
requirements such that they do not so strongly shield schools from Title IX liability.  
The Supreme Court, therefore, should reevaluate the actual notice requirement so 
that schools will incur liability with a hybrid actual-constructive notice standard.281  
Such a standard would hold the schools responsible for sexual harassment when 
they knew about some of it, even if the amount they knew of was not severe, and 
failed to determine the extent of it.  The Court should alter the deliberate 
indifference evaluation so that it requires an assessment of whether schools acted 
reasonably, as opposed to not clearly unreasonably, in response to the sexual 
harassment.  Assessing Title IX in these ways would limit schools’ discretion and 
shape school decisionmaking by requiring reasonable responses of schools in the 
face of notice of some peer sexual harassment.  It would therefore limit schools’ 
deference in determining whether and how to respond to it. 
Under the current Title IX regime, schools are not liable for peer sexual 
harassment unless they have actual notice of severe, pervasive levels of harassment.  
Abandoning the notion that schools will be burdened without such notice justifies a 
lesser standard of notice.  More specifically, it justifies a standard requiring that, 
when schools know of some sexual harassment, they must inquire into it, including 
into how severe and pervasive it is.   
Others scholars who have proposed changes to the Title IX standard have 
advocated for a pure constructive notice standard for Title IX violations.282  They have 
grounded their arguments in Title VII liability for employers for employee-on-
employee sexual harassment, which holds employers liable for employees’ sexual 
harassment that the employer knew or should have known about.283  However, the 
Supreme Court rejected that very argument in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent 
School District, its predecessor teacher sexual harassment case.284  The Gebser Court 
did so primarily on the basis of its interpretation of the Title IX statutory and 
 
280. See supra Subpart II.C. 
281. Title VII, which prohibits sexual harassment in employment, holds employers to a constructive 
notice standard for employee-on-employee sexual harassment.  29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (2018) 
(“With respect to conduct between fellow employees, an employer is responsible for acts of 
sexual harassment in the workplace where the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees) 
knows or should have known of the conduct, unless it can show that it took immediate and 
appropriate corrective action.”). 
282. See, e.g., MacKinnon, supra note 28, at 2096–97 (calling for something akin to a constructive 
notice standard—a due diligence standard); Furr, supra note 97 (calling for a constructive notice 
standard for Title IX peer harassment). 
283. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 281–82 (1998). 
284. Id. at 288–89. 
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administrative enforcement scheme.285  Setting aside the arguable flaws in that 
reasoning, the courts’ misconceptions about schools’ burdens do not cut to the 
heart of those Gebser rationales for rejecting a constructive notice standard.286  
Consequently, abandoning those misconceptions does not alone justify an 
adoption of a pure constructive notice standard.  However, because the courts’ 
misconceptions do underlie the Davis Court’s justifications for its actual notice 
standard, the abandonment of those misconceptions justifies at least a moderate 
change to the actual notice standard.287  The hybrid constructive-actual notice 
proposed here is such a standard.288  Although more tempered than a pure 
 
285. Id. at 289 (“It would be unsound, we think, for a statute’s express system of enforcement to 
require notice to the recipient and an opportunity to come into voluntary compliance while a 
judicially implied system of enforcement permits substantial liability without regard to the 
recipient’s knowledge or its corrective actions upon receiving notice.”). 
286. Justice Stevens pointed out some of these flaws in his dissent in Gebser.  Gebser, 524 U.S. at 301–
04 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Among other things, Justice Stevens noted that allowing a recovery 
in damages absent actual notice would not, as the majority contended, frustrate the purposes of 
Title IX.  Id. at 301.  Instead, Justice Stevens said it “seems quite obvious that [Title IX’s] purposes 
would be served—not frustrated—by providing a damages remedy in a case of this kind.”  Id.  
Further to that point, Justice Stevens said the majority’s justification for requiring actual notice, 
which was “that Congress has specified a particular administrative procedure to be followed 
when a [Title IX] subsidy is to be terminated, however, does not illuminate the question of what 
the victim of discrimination on the basis of sex must prove in order to recover damages in an 
implied private right of action.”  Id. at 303.  See also Amy Busa, Two Steps Forward, One Step 
Back: The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Teacher-Student Sexual Harassment in Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Independent School District, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 279, 299 (1999) (“[E]ven if Title 
IX were an exercise of Congress’ Spending Clause power, the Court still would not have been 
precluded from establishing liability as broad as that in Title VII cases.  Since Title IX, according 
to this view, affects only those institutions that accept federal funds, it stands to reason that those 
fund recipients would be required to undertake greater obligations to prevent intentional 
discrimination than an institution whose liability is established through a comprehensive 
regulatory program like Title VII.”). 
287. Although the Davis Court relied on Gebser in setting the actual notice and deliberate 
indifference standard for peer sexual harassment under Title IX, stating “we declined [in Gebser] 
the invitation to impose liability under what amounted to a negligence standard—holding the 
district liable for its failure to react to teacher-student harassment of which it knew or should 
have known,” the Davis Court did not explicitly adopt the Gebser Court’s rationale.  Davis v. 
Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642.  Instead the Davis Court focused on schools’ need 
for control over students as a predicate to and a limit on their liability to justify the actual notice 
standard.  See supra Subpart II.C.  That said, because the Davis Court did not reject the Gebser 
rationale, and so implicitly adopted it when it adopted the same actual notice standard, the full 
abandonment of the actual notice standard in favor of a pure constructive notice standard 
cannot be justified by abandoning only the stated rationales in the Davis decision.  While more 
tempered, the approach proposed here has application outside of peer sexual harassment claims.  
Because it accommodates for even the Gebser rationales that are not based on misconceptions 
about the burdens of liability on the schools, it justifies the change in standard for any kind of 
sexual harassment in schools, whether by students or teachers. 
288. The notice standard proposed here is a departure from how the courts have treated actual 
notice under Title IX but not a departure from traditional notions of actual notice.  Under the 
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constructive notice standard in that it would not involve holding schools liable 
under Title IX for any sexual harassment that they should have conceivably known 
about, it would require schools to investigate peer sexual harassment when they 
have direct notice of some sexual harassment.289   
Although holding schools liable for children’s behavior in ways that are 
similar—even if not identical—to the way that employers are held responsible for 
adults’ behavior could be criticized as unfair, since children cannot be expected to 
behave as well as adults, this criticism misses the point.290  Whether a child is more 
likely or not to engage in inappropriate behavior is irrelevant to whether and how a 
school finds out about it.  Children unquestionably are more likely to engage in 
inappropriate behavior, but that does not make schools less able to discover it.  
Indeed, given that children require more supervision than adults, schools should 
have more opportunities to discover student sexual harassment than an employer 
would have for employee sexual harassment. 
In addition, instead of evaluating deliberate indifference by inquiring into 
whether a school’s response was not clearly unreasonable, courts should ask whether 
a school acted reasonably.  Changing the evaluation of the deliberate indifference 
standard this way would effectively strengthen schools’ responses to peer sexual 
harassment.  It would not, however, require schools to cure or fully remedy the 
sexual harassment.  But it would require them to do something intended to remedy 
the sexual harassment because that is the reasonable response to such harms to 
children in school.  Of course, even interventions intended to remedy the harms 
can go awry or cause more harm.  In that instance, a school would act reasonably if 
it then tried to implement a better response.  The reasonable response, therefore, is 
not a perfect remedy but an honest attempt at a remedy.  Requiring schools to act 
reasonably does more, too, to shape their decisionmaking regarding their responses 
to sexual harassment than does the current standard, which requires far less of 
schools in response to sexual harassment. 
The change in this Title IX standard would also likely yield different results in 
some of the more egregious Title IX cases.291  For example, in Doe v. Board of 
Education, the schools’ awareness of some sexual harassment of student J.D. by 
student M.O., who climbed into J.D.’s bathroom stall and sexually assaulted him, 
 
common law, actual notice is comprised of both express and implied actual notice.  While 
express notice involves “actual notice consisting of knowledge brought personally home,” 
implied actual notice is “knowledge imputed and charged because of the surrounding facts 
and circumstances, which would lead one to discover or learn the fact by exercising ordinary 
care.” 58 AM. JUR. 2D Notice § 5. 
289. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 860. 
290. Davis, 526 U.S. at 675 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
291. See infra note 292 and accompanying text. 
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among other things, would give rise to an obligation to investigate whether any 
additional sexual harassment was occurring.292  Also, requiring that the school act 
reasonably in response to sexual harassment as proposed here would likely have 
resulted in a finding that the schools’ interventions that caused J.D. more harm 
were not reasonable and constituted deliberate indifference, particularly if the 
school did nothing to try to improve upon the counterproductive interventions.  
These likely changed results would also then foster the deterrent and fault-fixing 
effects of liability.  It would promote the implementation of better strategies for 
discovering and addressing the harms in order to avoid future liability.293 
E. A Critique and Its Answer 
One serious critique of these proposals is that they lack efficiency and breed a 
moral hazard.294  This concern derives from understandable worries over the cost 
of school liability on resource-poor schools.  A judgment in favor of one student 
could cost a school so much that it ultimately drains resources in a way that harms 
many more students.295  The dissent in Davis voiced essentially this concern when it 
 
292. 605 F. App’x 159, 162–63 (4th Cir. 2015).  Similarly, such a standard could help prevent the rape 
that happened in Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948 (11th Cir. 2015).  There, student CJC raped 
another student as the result of a plot devised by a school staff member to catch CJC in the act of 
sexual harassment.  Id. at 962–63.  The staff member concocted this plot because the school 
principal had implemented a “catch in the act” policy under which sexual harassment would be 
addressed if school staff caught a student in the act of harassment.  Id. at 957.  Under the 
standard proposed here, such a policy would violate Title IX because the Title IX standard 
would require action when schools know of some sexual harassment, including acting to 
investigate into the extent of it.  Further, in Hill, the school had repeated reports of sexual 
harassment by CJC.  Id. at 959–60.  Those reports under the proposed hybrid actual-
constructive notice standard would suffice to address CJC’s behavior and would require it be 
addressed in a way that aimed at preventing it. 
293. See supra Subpart IV.A. 
294. Moral hazard has been defined as “the perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to 
share the burdens of life.”  Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237, 
239 (1996).  This concern is in addition to the concern, addressed earlier, about the U.S. 
Constitution becoming a font of tort law.  See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
295. Another potential moral hazard is that increasing schools’ potential liability in the ways 
proposed here will cause them to respond by suspending and expelling and otherwise harshly 
punishing students to avoid liability.  This concern also has validity and is serious because 
schools have increasingly turned to these harsh punishments even without increased potential 
liability under the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.  See supra notes 178–180 and 
accompanying text.  However, while related, that problem is separate.  The law should not allow 
schools to evade responsibility for violating students’ civil and constitutional rights for fear they 
might respond by harshly punishing students.  Instead, other legal and policy mechanisms 
should be instituted to encourage schools to use more effective methods of discipline, such as 
those that emphasize positive, empathic relationships between students and adults.  See, e.g., 
Jason A. Okonofua et al., Brief Intervention to Encourage Empathic Discipline Cuts Suspension 
Rates in Half Among Adolescents, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACADS. SCI. 5221 (2016). 
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noted how liability in one Title IX case could overwhelm a small school district’s 
entire budget.296  Such concerns are not limited to the Title IX context.  They apply 
to any instance in which a school could be held liable for harms to a student. 
The first response to this critique is that, while schools undoubtedly labor 
under the burdens of financial constraints, the answer to these constraints should 
not be to leave children vulnerable to harms in school by limiting school liability.  
Allowing schools’ financial concerns to overcome student safety concerns 
privileges school finances over student safety, which is an untenable trade-off for a 
number of reasons.  First, students and their education are schools’ reason for 
being.  To sacrifice students’ safety and wellbeing undermines the whole enterprise.  
Second, allowing even one student to suffer harm to protect the greater good—that 
is, the greater financial good that benefits other students more generally—raises 
significant policy, not to mention moral, concerns.  These concerns include 
line-drawing questions about how many students the law will allow to be 
harmed before the school is liable.  Finally, the answer to schools’ financial 
concerns should not come at the expense of students’ safety and wellbeing but 
instead should be addressed through the states’ legislative and budgetary 
processes.297 
The second response to this critique is that liability under any theory could 
overwhelm a school district, especially a small one.  Therefore, the only way to really 
avoid the problems of efficiency and moral hazard is to limit schools’ liability 
entirely.  Completely limiting public school liability, though, would mean 
immunizing schools from liability under any provision of constitutional, statutory, 
or common law for which schools might have to pay damages.  These claims would 
include claims of racial or disability discrimination.  Eliminating the possibility of 
liability for all of these claims would leave students totally unprotected by the law 
and at the mercy of an all-powerful state while they are at school.  Such a result is 
absurd and, beyond that, unnecessary.  Schools already have protection from the 
ravages of liability on their budgets through insurance.298  These policies insulate 
 
296. Davis, 526 U.S. at 681 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The cost of defending against peer sexual 
harassment suits alone could overwhelm many school districts . . . .”). 
297. Not that doing so is easy or without its problems.  See, e.g., Black, supra note 208, at 431–32 
(pointing out that school funding cuts resulted not just from financial exigencies but also from 
state legislatures’ policy decisions). 
298. School districts do buy insurance to cover liability.  See Malia Herman, Threat of Data-Privacy 
Litigation Fuels District Insurance Purchases, EDUC. WEEK (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2015/10/21/threat-of-data-privacy-litigation-fuels-
district-insurance.html; see also Dave Arnold, Insuring Your Good Name, NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, 
http://www.nea.org/home/14629.htm [https://perma.cc/7TAF-VQPU]; Risk Management Fund, 
GA. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, https://gsba.com/member-services/risk-management/about-rms/risk-
management-fund/#school [https://perma.cc/34Y5-L7K5]; Errors & Omissions/General Liability 
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schools and their general population of students from the potential inefficiencies 
and moral hazard associated with liability for individual claims.299 
The third response to this critique is that the financial burden on schools may 
not be a relevant issue at all.  Students can seek injunctive relief under these civil 
rights claims.300  Such relief might require schools to change policies and 
procedures.  That kind of relief might result in some implementation cost to the 
schools, but it would not benefit one student disproportionately.  To the contrary, it 
would have the profound, lasting, “fault-fixing” effect of systemwide, institutional 
change that benefits students as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX can fulfill their potential for 
protecting public school children.  In the current analysis, however, they do not.  
The courts unjustifiably limit public school liability under these claims based on 
misconceptions and, further, provide schools with practically unbridled discretion 
to respond in meaningless, ineffective ways—if at all.  Collectively, these laws also 
leave students with limited legal recourse or protection in school and therefore 
vulnerable to harms.  They also shift the burden for protecting children from harm 
to the children’s families, a burden shifting that disproportionately impacts 
low-income families. 
Reducing these vulnerabilities and realizing these laws’ potential requires 
abandoning the misconceptions justifying limits to public school liability under 
these civil rights laws.  That in turn justifies increasing the public schools’ liability for 
their violations.  Holding public schools accountable for violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Title IX in the ways proposed here would make the protections of 
these civil rights laws meaningful for public school students and thus help fill the 
civil rights vacuum in school. 
  
 
Fund, N.C. SCH. BDS. ASS’N, http://www.ncsba.org/risk-management/errors-omissionsgeneral-
liability-fund [https://perma.cc/RQY9-XTHT]. 
299. As already noted, there may also be potential for insurers to regulate school behavior to better 
protect students in ways analogous to those articulated by John Rappaport.  Supra note 236. 
300. Injunctive relief has become far less available for some constitutional claims, notably those 
against police departments.  Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: 
Deputizing Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1398–99 
(2000).  However, they still survive in the school context.  E.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. 
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 714–15, 718–19 (2007) (considering and ultimately 
reversing the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision not to enjoin Seattle School District No. 1’s 
student assignment plan based on its consideration of race).  
